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ONE SMALL STEP FOR COURTS, ONE GIANT





African-Americans and Native Americans are detached
from mainstream American society. As individuals, they suffer
from this detachment; no less damaging is the suffering, of society
caused by the loss of individuals from a democracy that depends
on the "civic virtue" and participation of its members.
In this Article, Professor Kevin Worthen argues that Afri-
can-American and Native American youth would benefit greatly
from access to "intimate associations' groups that instill a sense
of belonging and societal values. Certain governmental enti-
ties-in the case of African-Americans, the inner-city public
schools, and, in the case of Native Americans, the tribe-could
fill this associational role if allowed to by the courts. Professor
Worthen believes that, with only a slight rethinking of existing
doctrines, the constitutional protection already afforded private
associations logically can extend to such governmental intimate
associations. This 'mall step" by the judiciary would allow
public schools and tribes to form associations that may exclude
some, but will fill the associational void for others and benefit
both individuals and society by helping prepare the "Native
Sons" to live productive lives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dreary statistics are all too familiar. Over 50% of the male
prisoners in America's prisons are African-Americans even though Afri-
can-American men constitute only 12% of the country's male popula-
tion.' One in four African-American males between the ages of fifteen
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.A.
1979, J.D. 1982, Brigham Young University. This Article would not have been possible with-
out the research, analysis, critical evaluation, and enthusiastic promptings of Ken Kuykendall
and Carl Hernandez, nor without the able research of Joe Zeidner and Roy Montclair. The
author also expresses appreciation to Bill Bryner and Steve Baldridge for reviewing earlier
drafts of this Article.
1. Robert Staples, Black Male Genocide: A Final Solution to the Race Problem in
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and twenty-four is either in prison, on probation, or on parole.2 Homi-
cide is the leading cause of death for African-American male teenagers
and young adults.3 African-American males between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-four are more than three times as likely to die from homicide
or suicide than their white counterparts.4 Over 35% of all African-
American males are drug and alcohol abusers.5 For African-American
men in Harlem, life expectancy is shorter than that for men in Bangla-
desh.6 In short, as one sociologist observed, "[y]oung black males are
continuing to kill, maim, or narcotize themselves faster than they could
be annihilated through wars or natural disasters." 7
Clearly, America is in danger of losing what some have called its
"Native Sons."8 Furthermore, African-American males are not the only
contemporary group whose agonizing statistics reveal both American so-
ciety's past failures and the group members' present state of woe. A sim-
ilar picture is painted by demographic data concerning America's other
Native Children-Native American youth. Their statistical profile,
while not as familiar to most Americans, is equally dreary. The suicide
rate among Native American youth between the ages of fifteen and
America, in BLACK MALE ADOLESCENTS: PARENTING AND EDUCATION IN COMMUNITY
CONTEXT 39, 41 (Benjamin P. Bowser ed., 1991) (citing ROBERT STAPLES, BLACK MASCU-
LINITY: THE BLACK MALE'S ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1982)).
2. Daniel Goleman, Black Scientists Study the "Pose" of the Inner City, N.Y. TIMES,
April 21, 1992, at Cl.
3. Jewelle T. Gibbs, Young Black Males in America: Endangered, Embittered, and Em-
battled, in YOUNG, BLACK, AND MALE IN AMERICA: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES 1, 15
(Jewelle T. Gibbs et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter YOUNG, BLACK, AND MALE IN AMERICA].
4. The death rate from homicide and suicide among African-American males in that age
group is 75.2 per 100,000; the homicide and suicide death rate among whites between the ages
of 15 and 24 is 22.3 per 100,000. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH
UNITED STATES 1991 AND PREVENTION PROFILE 155 (1991); see also Goleman, supra note 2,
at Cl (noting that "48 percent of black males between 15 and 19 who died were shot, while the
figure for white males was just 18 percent").
5. Staples, supra note 1, at 41.
6. Goleman, supra note 2, at Cl.
7. Jewelle T. Gibbs, The New Morbidity: Homicide, Suicide, Accidents, and Life-Threat-
ening Behaviors, in YOUNG, BLACK, AND MALE IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 258, 281-82,
This statement is in some ways literally true. In 1977 alone, more young African-American
males (5,734) died from homicide than were killed from 1963 to 1972 in the Vietnam War
(5,640). Id.
8. The term Native Son was first used by Richard Wright as the title of a novel in which
the main character represented many disaffected African-American males of the 1930s and
1940s. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON xxxi (1940). Wright explained his selection of the
title by observing that persons like the main character were "an American product, a native
son of this land." Id. Essayist James Baldwin used the same term as the title of his 1955
collection of fiery essays about life among African-American males of that time period. JAMES
BALDwIN, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON (1955).
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nineteen is more than twice that of the rest of American youth." Among
Native Americans between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four, death
from suicide, homicide, or liver disease (usually the result of over-con-
sumption of alcohol) is more than twice as likely as for non-Native
Americans. 10 Native Americans are.nearly four times as likely to die
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four as are their contemporaries of
other races.1"
Most young African-American males and Native Americans of both
genders share little in common in their day-to-day lives, yet they obvi-
ously share the dubious distinction of being part of America's most dis-
advantaged. Members of these two groups are not being mainstreamed
into American society. The search for remedies for the problems suffered
by these two seemingly disparate groups has been as unsuccessful as it
has been unrelenting. Billions of dollars have been spent in the effort, as
wave after wave of federal and state programs have attempted to bring
order to this chaos, without effect. Private efforts, although not as well-
funded, have been just as innovative and, unfortunately, just as
unavailing.
This Article suggests that some of the problems faced by these two
groups, as well as similar problems faced by others in American society,
can be resolved by focusing on the potential role of a hybrid public-pri-
vate entity-the intimate government association.' 2 Courts traditionally
9. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INDIAN ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 16
(1990). The suicide rate for Native American youth in this age group for 1986 was 26.3 per
100,000. Among youth of all other races in the United States the rate was 10.0 per 100,000.
Id. Suicide rates among 10 to 14 year-old Native Americans are approximately four times
higher than for Americans of other races of that age. Id
The suicide rate among 15 to 24 year-old Native Americans is 24.0 per 100,000, as com-
pared to 13.1 per 100,000 among the same age groups for other Americans. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH 1990, at 28 [hereinafter
TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH 1990]. Among other non-white races, the suicide rate for 15 to
24 year-olds is only 7.7 per 100,000, id at 42 (less than one-third of the rate among Native
Americans)-a difference not quite made up for in the disparate homicide rate among the two
groups, id. at 44 (the homicide rate among Native Americans ages 15 to 24 equals 20.1 per
100,000; among other non-white groups of the same age it is 40.8 per 100,000). Apparently,
Native American youths kill themselves; African-American males kill each other.
10. The death rate for Native Americans between the ages of 25 and 44 from liver disease
is 28.7 per 100,000, from suicide 25.0 per 100,000, and from homicide 25.2 per 100,000 (a total
of 78.9 per 100,000). Among the same age groups in all other races, the rates are 5.7 per
100,000 from liver disease, 15.5 per 100,000 from suicide, and 14.1 per 100,000 from homicide
(a total of 35.3 per 100,000). TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH 1990, supra note 9, at 29.
11. TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH 1990, supra note 9, at 37. Of the deaths among Native
Americans, 7.4% occur among youths between the ages of 15 and 24. Id. Deaths among 15 to
24 year-olds in the rest of the American population account for only 1.9% of total deaths. Id.
12. The term "intimate government association" refers to those government entities
which are capable of performing the role traditionally performed by intimate private associa-
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have given wide latitude and, more recently, increased constitutional pro-
tection from outside interference, to choices made by members of private
intimate associations.13 At the same time, whenever any government has
engaged in the same kinds of activities, the weight of the constitutional
scales has tipped dramatically in the opposite direction, in response to
outraged cries of invasion of individual rights.14 This differential treat-
ment for private and government associations is not without justification.
An overly formalistic approach to the problem, however, has led courts
to overlook the possibility that under some circumstances government
associations of some kinds can provide the benefits of private intimate
associations without incurring all the risks inherent in allowing a large
centralized government to become the sole purveyor of all moral and
social values. Although classified as state actors under current law, these
entities function at times like private associations.
Courts have adopted a functional test for identifying those private
intimate associations entitled to constitutional protection.1 5 They also
have readily acknowledged in other contexts that some local government
entities perform these functions.16 Blind adherence to abstract formal-
isms concerning the distinction between private and public entities, how-
ever, has prevented courts from adding the two concepts together to
provide local government entities with the breathing space they need to
perform their associational roles. Unfortunately, while judges continue
to fiddle to the tune of these anachronistic melodies, South Central Los
Angeles burns. 7
This Article will demonstrate that the elements for defining a legiti-
mate associational role of intimate governments have already been recog-
nized, both by social theorists and by the courts." The Article then
illustrates how formal legal recognition of the associational role of inti-
mate governments can resolve some of the problems currently plaguing
tions. See infra text accompanying notes 22-63. This Article focuses on two such governmen-
tal entities, local school districts, see infra section III, and Native American tribes, see infra
section IV.
13. As used in this Article, private intimate associations include non-governmental groups
of persons sharing highly personal relationships, such as families. See, eg., Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984). The Supreme Court has generally focused on the
family when discussing private intimate associations, id. at 619-20, but has indicated that the
class is not "restricted to relationships among family members." Board of Directors of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
14. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1715 (1988).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 86-93.
17. See David Ellis, LA. Lawless, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 26 (describing rioting in South
Central Los Angeles following acquittal of policemen charged with beating Rodney King).
18. See infra section II.
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both inner-city minority males and isolated Native Americans.19 Using
previously recognized doctrines, courts can, with little effort, make a
profound difference in the lives of many Americans by allowing them to
experience the freedom and security currently enjoyed only by those with
access to traditional intimate associations. This one small step by the
courts can enable disadvantaged groups to take a giant leap forward.
II. THE BENEFITS OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS TO AmERICAN
DEMOCRACY: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The right of association is almost as inalienable as the right of
personal liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing
the very foundations of society.
20
While current courts are quick to recognize the critical contribution
of intimate associations to individual liberty,21 they often overlook the
societal benefits these associations provide in a democratic society. The
societal benefits of intimate associations have been articulated for centu-
ries by political theorists, and constitutional theory has recently recog-
nized the concept in a very generalized form. A brief examination of this
history of political and legal recognition of the societal benefits of inti-
mate associations reveals that the tools are in place to construct a func-
tional test for protecting intimate associations from undue outside
interference. By considering intimate associations and governments in
more functional and less formalistic terms, courts can begin to help more
American citizens, including inner-city African-American males and res-
ervation Native American youth, enjoy the benefits provided by intimate
associations.
A. The Political and Social Theorists' View of the Contribution of
Intimate Associations to Society
Political theorists long have recognized the societal value of associa-
tions positioned between the individual and the State.22 Aristotle, for
19. See infra sections III, IV.
20. 1 ALEXiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 222 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1961).
21. See, eg., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (discussing con-
tribution of intimate associations to individual liberty); Trade Waste Management Ass'n v.
Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 236-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that right of intimate association protects
individual autonomy).
22. As one political theorist explained, the genealogy of this affinity for voluntary associa-
tions can be traced back to ancient Greece:
Solon recognized and confirmed the Greek instinct for freedom of association, and
Aristotle... incorporated this freedom in his political philosophy. St. Augustine,
more sensitive even than Aristotle to the voluntary aspect of human association, de-
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example, argued that society benefitted from these intermediate associa-
tions because they functioned as a protection against universal conform-
ity.23 Other philosophers from Augustine to Aquinas to Locke reiterated
this theme.24 De Tocqueville, of course, most clearly articulated the po-
sition that associations are essential to the success of American democ-
racy: If those who live in a democracy "never acquired the habit of
forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be
endangered.1
25
Modem political and social theorists have articulated more specifi-
cally how associations serve not only individual ends but those of society
as well. Two main themes have emerged. First, theorists have connected
associations with the perpetuation and transmission of a common value
system-a value system essential to the preservation of democracy. Be-
cause democratic society is based on the concept of self-government, its
citizens must be educated in certain ways. They must be taught to be
concerned with more than self, to be restrained by some inner values
from the unfettered pursuit of selfish interest.26 In short, they must pos-
sess what the constitutional framers called public or civic virtue.27
The connection between civic virtue and the republican form of gov-
fined a political organization as "a group of rational beings, associated on the basis of
a common tie in respect of those things which they love."
John W. Chapman, Voluntary Association and the Political Theory of Pluralism, in VOLUN-
TARY ASSOCIATIONS 87, 89 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1969).
23. CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 3 (1962) (citing POLITICS VIII, at 1).
Aristotle rejected Plato's notion that no organization should exist between the State and the
individual, id. (citing POLmCS II, at 5), and advocated the right of citizens to join "partial
limited associations." Id. (citing POLITICS VIII, at I).
24. Id. at 3-5, 9-13.
25. 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 130.
26. As one political theorist noted, "The conviction that ... action controlled by inner
authority, leads to an harmonious social and political world forms an important condition of
modem democracy." Chapman, supra note 22, at 93 (quoting ZEVEDEI BARBU, DEMOCRACY
AND DICTATORSHIP: THEIR PSYCHOLOGY AND PA7rERNS OF LIFE 73 (1956)) (emphasis ad-
ded). George Washington framed the same sentiment this way: "It is substantially true that
virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government." 2 GEORGE DE HUSZR ET
AL., BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 108-09 (1953), quoted in RICHARD VETTERLI & GARY
BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLIC VIRTUE AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 70 (1987).
27. As historian Gordon S. Wood observed:
In a monarchy each man's desire to do what was right in his own eyes could be
restrained by fear or force. In a republic, however, each man must somehow be
persuaded to submerge his personal wants into the greater good of the whole. This
willingness of the individual to sacrifice his private interests for the good of the com-
munity-such patriotism or love of country-the eighteenth century termed "public
virtue."
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERiCAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 68 (1969).
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ernment created by the United States Constitution was well recognized
by those involved in the document's adoption. Madison asserted in The
Federalist that "Republican government presupposes the existence of
th[o]se qualities [of human nature "which justify a certain portion of es-
teem and confidence"] in a higher degree than any other form."28 Simi-
larly, writing in 1775, Samuel Williams argued that while despots could
maintain order by the use of fear, "a free government ... cannot be sup-
ported without virtue."'29 Indeed, as Gordon Wood observed, "[t]hat the
... very existence of a republic depended upon the people's virtue was 'a
maxim' established by the 'universal consent' and the 'experience of all
ages.' "30
Intimate associations often provide the setting for this critical edu-
cation for civic virtue,31 education not just of the mind, but of the soul
and heart.32 The social interaction experienced by members of intimate
associations presents them with opportunities to learn social norms es-
sential to civic virtue, such as concern for more than self and respect for
group norms that may differ from individual predilection.3 3  As a result,
intimate associations often serve to integrate individuals from minority
groups into larger society by cultivating civic virtue. They also offer a
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 379 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
29. SAMUEL WILLIAMS, A DISCOURSE ON THE LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY 13-14 (1775),
quoted in VETrERLI & BRYNER, supra note 26, at 74.
"30. WOOD, supra note 27, at 92; see also VETrRLi & BRYNER, supra note 26, at 73-75
(stating that virtue is a "necessity to popular Government").
31. One scholar traces the link between private associational life and civic virtue back to
Aristotle. David W. Brown, Civic Virtue in America, 67 NAT'L F. 39, 39 (1987).
32. Even Rousseau, who opposed many kinds of voluntary associations, recognized their
role in generating and maintaining the standards of behavior and the elements of civic virtue
essential to the perpetuation of good government. Maure L. Goldschmidt, Rousseau on Inter-
mediate Associations, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 22, at 119, 124-27. For exam-
ple, he condemned proposals that he believed would weaken "circles" or clubs organized for
amusement. Such circles contributed to "the tone of good sense and judgment" that existed in
Geneva at the time by preserving republican morals among their members and "'combin[ing]
everything which can contribute to making friends, citizens, and soldiers out of the same men,
and in consequence, everything which is most appropriate to a free people."' Id. at 125 (quot-
ing Jean J. Rousseau, Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre 100, 105 (Allan Bloom trans.,
1960)).
33. CONSTANCE SMITH & ANNE FREEDMAN, VOLUNTARY ASSOCLTIONS: PERSPEC-
TIVES ON THE LrrERATURE 14 (1972). In the words of one political scientist, the proliferation
of voluntary associations offers the "promise of order and stability."
In what would otherwise be a condition of rulelessness save what is given by the
impersonal, hostile, and commanding laws of the general society, the private associa-
tions build norms and patterns of behavior which are those naturally chosen by the
members themselves and to which they gladly give obedience, since these are no
more than the commands that a man gives himself.
Grant McConnell, The Public Values of Private Association, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS,
supra note 22, at 147, 149.
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"legitimate locus for the affirmation and expression of values."34
In some ways, intimate associations are the only entities that can
teach the norms of civic virtue.35 The manner in which this critical edu-
cation occurs in intimate associations is perhaps best illustrated by the
quintessential intimate association: the family.3 6 "American society has
relied to a considerable extent on the family not only to nurture the
young but also to instill the habits required by citizenship in a self-gov-
erning community. We have relied on the family to teach us to care for
others, [and] to moderate... self-interest .... In the family, children
are compelled to learn to deal with authority, responsibility, and duty in
an atmosphere of love that permits these lessons to be learned effectively.
As one scholar noted, "[s]omething about the combined permanence, au-
thority, and love that characterize the formal family uniquely makes pos-
sible the... teaching [of moral and civic duty]."38
34. David Sills, Voluntary Associations, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 372-76 (David Sills ed., 1968).
35. As De Tocqueville noted:
Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is
developed by no other means than by the reciprocal influence of men upon each
other. I have shown that these influences are almost null in democratic countries;
they must therefore be artificially created, and this can only be accomplished by
associations.
2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 131.
36. As the Supreme Court has observed, "Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
Thus, the traditional familial relationship has been the intimate association that has consist-
ently received the highest constitutional protection from state interference. See, e.g., Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating that the rela-
tionship between grandmother and grandchild prevails over zoning ordinance prohibiting
them from living in same house); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating that
the relationship between parent and child justifies exemption from compulsory school attend-
ance law); Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the constitutional right of familial association includes right of parent and sibling
not to be deprived of relationship with child and brother through intentional state action re-
sulting in the death of the child and brother). The Supreme Court has noted, however, that
"we have not held that constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among family
members." Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
37. WALTER BERNs, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY 222 (1976), quoted in Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kin-
ship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv.
463, 477 (1983).
38. Hafen, supra note 37, at 477; see also Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in
Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1, 41 (stating that "families are
... mediating institutions that prepare not only children but adults for the democratic interac-
tion that literally depends upon a rational willingness to obey the unenforceable").
Public Management teacher David Brown has noted the connection between the family
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Associations other than the family also can teach some of these
same lessons. 39 Thus, once the drafters of the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 had concluded that "morality... [is] necessary to good govern-
ment," they provided that "schools and the means of education shall for-
ever be encouraged."' De Tocqueville touted the ability of townships-
local government entities-to engender the critical feelings of civic virtue
in the hearts and minds of democratic citizens: "[M]unicipal institutions
constitute the strength of free nations. Town-meetings are to liberty
what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's
reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it."41 The greater
control over local affairs resulting from democratic local governments
engenders feelings of civic virtue among residents because the citizens
more readily perceive the connection between their private interests and
the interests of the general public.42 Thus, the.role of associations, both
and the development of civic virtue, explaining that "we first learn about the nature of obliga-
tion from our parents by the degree to which they remain lovingly obliged to each other and to
the institution of marriage, lovingly obliged to their children and to the family as an institu-
tion." Brown, supra note 31, at 39, 40.
39. In discussing Justice Brennan's comments concerning the societal benefits of intimate
associations in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984), Professor Doug-
las Linder observed, "Brennan was writing about personal relationships (especially the family),
but his observation has validity as well when applied to somewhat less personal, larger associa-
tions such as churches and political parties." Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom ofAssociation After
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MiCH. L. REv. 1878, 1882 (1984).
40. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
41. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 76 (Francis Bowen ed.,
1863).
42. De Tocqueville admired the genius behind the American decision to place considera-
ble authority in local governments and noted the relationship between this scheme and the
development of feelings of civic virtue:
The general affairs of a country only engage the attention of leading politicians, who
assemble from time to time in the same places; and as they often lose sight of each
other afterwards, no lasting ties are established between them. But if the object be to
have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside there, the same
persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted,
and to adapt themselves to one another.
It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of
the state, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the
state can have upon his own lot. But if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of
his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small public
affair and his greatest private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to
him, the close tie which unites private to general interest.
2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 125. De Tocqueville argued that local governments
were, therefore, essential to the creation and preservation of civic virtue because the lack of
interest in local affairs resulting from the absence of local governmental authority creates a
situation in which citizens are so reliant upon the far-away central government that "if his own
safety or that of his children is endangered, instead of trying to avert the peril, he will fold his
arms, and wait till the nation comes to his assistance." 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at
94. When that happens, De Tocqueville theorized, the nation "must either change its customs
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private and governmental, in perpetuating and transmitting the values of
civic virtue-the lifeblood of democracy-has been widely recognized by
social and political theorists, ancient and modem.
The second societal benefit of intimate associations commonly es-
poused by theorists focuses on the pluralism benefits these associations
provide. Political theorists have asserted that intimate associations serve
as the principal building blocks of diversity and pluralism. 43 Intimate
associations provide the setting for transmitting diverse cultural ideas
from generation to generation. They also protect diverse cultures by pro-
viding the strength of the group as a counterweight against the often
uniformizing wishes of majoritarian governments.4" This perpetuation of
cultural diversity is essential to societal enjoyment of the benefits of plu-
ralism: "greater respect for others, greater awareness of the meaning of
one's own values, and refinement of overall value systems from compari-
son with others."45 Moreover, voluntary associations reflecting diverse
views often contribute to orderly and stable change in society by provid-
ing positive outlets and directions for these views, rather than allowing
them to foment below the surface until revolution occurs.46
Thus, political and social theorists consistently have recognized the
key role that intimate associations play in a democracy. 47 Some have
also concluded that in American society portions of this role can be
played by intimate or localized governments.4 8 Intimate associations
provide the environment for inculcating in new generations the habits of
civic virtue on which the success of any democratic government ulti-
mately rests. They also facilitate the preservation of social diversity and
orderly change. Without such associations, democratic society would be
and its laws, or perish: the source of public virtue is dry; and though it may contain subjects,
the race of citizens is extinct." IM
43. See JACQUES MARrTAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 11 (1951) (asserting the necessity for
intermediate associations in modem pluralistic society). See generally Linder, supra note 39, at
1881 (stating that "the right of an association to define its own membership, is fundamental to
a conception of a pluralistic free society"); Note, State Power and Discrimination by Private
Clubs: First Amendment Protection for Nonexpressive Associations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1835,
1839 (1991) (stating that "private associations are the principal building blocks of societal
diversity and pluralism").
44. Kevin J Worthen, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative Power of
American Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND. L. Rnv. 1273, 1300 (1991).
45. Id. at 1301.
46. McConnell, supra note 33, at 154-57.
47. Of course, other philosophers, including such luminaries as Plato, Hobbes, and Rous-
seau, have viewed associations between the state and the individual with much less favor. See
generally RiCE, supra note 23, at 2-3, 6-8, 13-15. Even some of these skeptics, however, recog-
nized the positive societal benefits that these associations could provide under appropriate cir-
cumstances. See supra note 32 (discussing Rousseau's defense of "circles").
48. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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radically altered, and quite possibly would cease to exist in any meaning-
ful sense. Moreover, those who lack access to these associations will
often fail to learn the critical lessons of heart and mind or acquire the
positive direction needed to help them become productive, fulfilled citi-
zens of a democratic society.
B. The Constitutional Role of Intimate Associations
While recognition of the importance of intimate associations does
not have the same long tradition in constitutional law that it does in
social and political theory, some form of constitutional protection against
government intrusion in the "formation and preservation of certain kinds
of highly personal relationships" has been recognized for at least sixty
years.49 The United States Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees5° identified two distinct constitutionally protected roles for inti-
mate associations. The Court first observed that "certain kinds of per-
sonal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual
and the power of the State."51 This focuses on the benefit such associa-
tions provide to society. The Court then noted that intimate associations
also serve individual interests, reflecting the "realization that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others"
and that this "ability independently to define one's identity ... is central
49. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The earliest judicial rec-
ognition cited by the Roberts Court was Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
The textual source of the constitutional right of intimate association is not entirely clear.
The word "association" is not mentioned in the Constitution. Nonetheless, in Roberts, the
Court observed that its prior decisions had "referred to constitutionally protected 'freedom of
association' in two distinct senses." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617. The first has come to be known
as intimate association because it "protects against unjustified government interference with an
individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships." Board
of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987). The Court has indicated
that the constitutional source of this right is the First Amendment, l at 545, but some lower
courts continue to assert that it is an element of substantive due process. Swank v. Smart, 898
F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 147 (1990).
The second right, now known as the right of "expressive association," is more clearly tied
to the First Amendment since it protects the "right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
This Article focuses on the right of intimate association. It does not address the issue of
whether the protection afforded intimate associations by the current Court is properly located
in the First, Fourteenth, or even any amendment. That issue has, and will continue, to provide
fertile ground for legal debate. The points advanced by this Article are, however, premised on
the existence of a constitutional right of intimate association.
50. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
51. Id. at 618-19.
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to any concept of liberty."52
The individual liberty rationale for protecting intimate associations
has been the focus of most post-Roberts discussion of the issue. 3
Although the societal benefits of intimate associations have, by and large,
been ignored since Roberts, 4 use of societal benefits to justify constitu-
tional protection for intimate associations has considerable support in
pre-Roberts case law. By shifting the focus to the societal benefits of inti-
mate associations, current courts would not be charting a new course,
but merely taking a few small steps down a path outlined in prior
opinions.
One of the earliest recognitions of the constitutional status of inti-
mate associations emphasized the societal benefits that such associations
can provide. In 1925, upholding the right of parents to send their chil-
dren to private schools, the Supreme Court concluded that parents and
guardians had the constitutional right to direct the education of their
children because "those who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations."55 Presumably, these obligations include the
duty to participate in democratic government in a productive way. More
recently, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 6 the Court indicated that
52. Id. at 619.
53. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships" and that one of the primary benefits of liberty comes "from the freedom an
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds") (all emphasis
except "choose" added); Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221,236-37 (3d
Cir. 1985) (stating that the right of intimate association recognizes "a zone of individual auton-
omy with respect to individual human relationships that must be secured against undue intru-
sion by the state") (emphasis added); Republican Party v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 277 (2d Cir.
1985) (referring to intimate association as an "individualistic aspect of associational rights"),
affid, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
This focus on the individual value of intimate associations is not surprising when one
realizes that in his seminal article on intimate associations, Kenneth Karst listed as "values" of
intimate associations only individualistic values. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 630-37 (1980) (listing society, caring and commitment, inti-
macy, and self-identification as values of intimate association). Karst did not mention any of
the societal benefits of intimate associations.
54. The only Supreme Court elaboration on the societal-benefits prong of Roberts came in
rejecting a claim that a law regulating the use of motel rooms for short periods of time violated
the patrons' right of intimate association. The Court curtly observed: "Any 'personal bonds'
that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those that have
'played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmit-
ting shared ideals and beliefs.'" FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990)
(quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19).
55. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
56. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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familial association received constitutional protection because "[ilt is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished social values, moral and cultural." 7 Again, although the
Court did not elaborate on this theme, "cherished values" would seem to
include those essential to civic virtue on which the republic: was founded.
Similar references to the fundamental role of familial associations in our
society can be found in other cases.58 The Court also has noted that
intimate associations serve societal ends by fostering diversity in a pro-
ductive way. By providing a positive means for cultivating and perpetu-
ating diverse viewpoints, intimate associations produce the kind of
diversity "that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures
peaceful, orderly change."5 9
Thus,, pre-Roberts case law identified at least two constitutionally
protected societal functions performed by intimate associations: first, ed-
ucating youth in unenumerated essential social values, thereby preparing
them for their future obligations as citizens of a democracy; second, fos-
tering the development of diverse ideas in a way that permits pluralistic
society to exist and change in an orderly manner. The Roberts Court's
recognition of these societal benefits of intimate association, therefore,
was not novel. It was a continuation of a consistent thread of twentieth-
century constitutional law. Moreover, as noted above, theorists recog-
nized these societal benefits long before the Court articulated them."
Under a purely functionalist approach, any association that serves
either of these two functions deserves some constitutional protection, at
least to the extent that protection is needed to further those ends. From
a functional standpoint, whether the association fits into some precon-
ceived traditional category is relatively unimportant.61 That- is not to
say, however, that the manner in which the association traditionally has
performed its role is completely irrelevant. Fearful of rendering the iden-
tification process open-ended and unprincipled, the Court has extended
constitutional protection only to those associations which have some tra-
57. Id. at 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion).
58. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (concluding that parental
control reflects a "strong tradition" founded on "[tihe history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion" and that it "is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition");
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (stating that right of parents to make deci-
sions without undue interference from the state is "basic in the structure of our society").
59. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974), cited in Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 619.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 22-48.
61. As Justice Harlan explained, "it is the purposes of those guarantees and not their text,
the reasons for their statement by the Framers and not the statement itself which have led to
their present status in the compendious notion of 'liberty' embraced in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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dition of performing the socially beneficial roles of intimate associa-
tions. 2 This emphasis on tradition, however, does not preclude the
extension of constitutional protection to intimate associations for which
the protection has not previously been legally recognized. If an associa-
tion has demonstrated an ability to make the kinds of contributions to
American society that have entitled other intimate associations to that
protection, it should be entitled to protection even if it is a new kind of
association or one not previously acknowledged by the courts. 3
Accordingly, although post-Roberts decisions have focused almost
exclusively on the individual-benefits rather than the societal-benefits ra-
tionale for providing constitutional protection to intimate associations,"
extending some form of constitutional protection to any association that
can perform these socially beneficial functions is warranted by both polit-
ical theory and Supreme Court precedent.
Use of this functional analysis would not constitute a radical depar-
ture from the test for identifying intimate associations outlined by the
Court in Roberts and its progeny. That test focuses on four main factors:
the "[1] size, [2] purpose, [3] selectivity [of the group], and [4] whether
others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship."6 Each of
these factors relates in some way to the association's ability to transmit
shared values and promote diverse, stable cultures. For example, the as-
sociation's ability to transmit core values (either shared or diverse) obvi-
ously diminishes with the size of the group in which the transmission
occurs. Transmission of such values also generally is facilitated by con-
62. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Our decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institu-
tion of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.") (footnote omitted);
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 ("The history... of Western civilization reflect[s] a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.").
63. As Justice Harlan explained, while it is important to consult the teachings of history
when deciding what interests deserve constitutional protection, "tradition is a living thing. A
decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision
which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound." Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
64. See, eg., Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing intimate associ-
ation as essential to "individual freedom"); Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1500
(9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that "the freedom of intimate association is coextensive with the
right of privacy"); Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 236-37 (3d Cir.
1985) (asserting that freedom of intimate association "recognizes our status as autonomous
human beings protected from governmental interference that denigrates our personality and
prevents our full self fulfillment"); Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1187, 1186
n.7 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that the freedom of intimate association "draws support from the
... values of self-expression and identification").
65. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987); see also
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (substantially the same factors).
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trol over the criteria for membership in the association (the third fac-
tor-selectivity) and over the exclusion of nonmembers at critical times
(the fourth factor).66 Finally, examination of the purpose of the associa-
tion is by its very nature functional. If the primary function of the asso-
ciation is to facilitate commercial transactions or provide eating facilities,
it is unlikely to be classified as an intimate association.67 If, by contrast,
one of the association's principal functions is to instruct its members in
civic virtue (by precept or experience) or maintain a diverse culture, the
association is obviously more likely to be granted constitutional protec-
tion under a functional approach. The multi-factored inquiry outlined
by the Roberts Court can, therefore, easily be adapted to an approach
that focuses on the association's ability to perform the socially-beneficial
functions of intimate associations.
Under this functional analysis, an association would receive consti-
tutional protection from state or federal intervention to the extent that
the association has demonstrated the ability either to cultivate and trans-
mit the shared ideals and beliefs essential to the preservation of democ-
racy or to foster diversity and act as a critical buffer between the
individual and the power of the State.6" Although few governmental
entities would satisfy this test,69 public schools could qualify under the
first prong. Native American tribes could qualify under the second.
III. CULTIVATING AND TRANSMITTING SHARED IDEALS AND
BELIEFS: THE ASSOCIATIONAL ROLE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we
belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of
public affections.70
66. Secrecy in fundamental religious ceremonies where critical learning occurs is fairly
common. For example, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints limits temple attend-
ance to those deemed worthy by church officials. Bruce Buursma, Mormons Open Monument
to the "Worthy,' Cm. TRIB., July 14, 1985, at CIO. Participation in sweat lodge ceremonies by
Native Americans is also generally restricted. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
67. In New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988), the Court
rejected an attempt to extend intimate association protection to all the clubs covered by New
York City's anti-discrimination ordinance, in part because the clubs provided regular meal
service to both members and nonmembers and because the city had found them to be largely
"'commercial' in nature, 'where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable
for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed."' Id. at 12.
Similarly, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts emphasized the predominantly commer-
cial nature of the Jaycees. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 638-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33 (discussing limited situations in which gov-
ernment entities would qualify as intimate associations).
70. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1977) (quoting Edmund Burke).
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May there not be in human nature a deep hunger to form a
bond of union with one's fellows which runs deeper than that of
legally defined duty and counterduty?
Has the frigid legal atmosphere of our basic associations
driven some of us, in search of a richer bond of union with our
fellows, into becoming Mods or Rockers, Hell's Angels, and
shouters of filthy words?
71
The desire to belong to some group or society seems to be innate in
most humans.72 In our nation, this desire traditionally has been satisfied
by families, religious groups, and various voluntary associations. For
many inner-city youth, however, these traditional associations do not ex-
ist or function in any meaningful way. As a result, the essential values of
civic virtue are not passed on, and the individual becomes alienated from
society. In the words of sociologist Jewelle Taylor Gibbs:
With the breakdown or weakening of... traditional insti-
tutions within inner-city communities, there has been a parallel
breakdown of the traditional black community values of the
importance of family, religion, education, self-improvement,
and social cohesion through extensive social support networks.
Many blacks in inner cities no longer seem to feel connected to
each other, responsible for each other, or concerned about each
other. Rather than a sense of shared community and a com-
mon purpose, which once characterized black neighborhoods,
these inner cities now reflect a sense of hopelessness, alienation,
and frustration.
71
Recognizing this phenomenon among "urbanites" more than forty
years ago,74 sociologist Louis Wirth predicted that the urban resident
71. Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS,
supra note 22, at 3, 21.
72. That is in part the thrust of Aristotle's observation that "man is by nature a political
animal." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans.), in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WEST-
ERN WORLD, 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 446 (Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc. 1952). That
observation has not gone unchallenged, however. See generally Worthen, supra note 44, at
1296 n. 113 (noting the ongoing debate on the issue between liberal and communitarian polit-
ical theorists).
73. Gibbs, supra note 3, at 19. Gibbs concluded that "[i]t is exactly this kind of frustra-
tion that exploded in the urban riots of the 1960s." Id.
74. Wirth asserted that urban residents would be "reduced to a stage of virtual impotence
as an individual," observing that urban life is characterized by the "substitution of secondary
for primary contacts, the weakening of bonds of kinship, and the declining social significance
of the family, the disappearance of the neighborhood, and the undermining of the traditional
basis of social solidarity." Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, in READER IN URBAN
SOCIOLOGY 32, 46-47 (Paul K. Hatt & Albert J. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1951), cited in SMITH &
FREEDMAN, supra note 33, at 15.
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would combat these trends by "joining with others of similar interest into
organized groups to obtain his ends.""5 Wirth probably had in mind
groups such as the Rotary Club or the local unit of the Boy Scouts. For
increasing numbers of inner-city African-American males, however, the
groups that fill this function have names like "Crips" or "Bloods."
Longing to belong to some group and finding none more readily avail-
able, these youths turn to the one group that will mainstream them into
some kind of larger society.76 Unfortunately, the society into which they
are integrated contains cells and guards.
In looking for positive associational alternatives to gangs, primary
emphasis has been placed on other private associations, such as the fam-
ily or local boys' clubs. While associations with such groups should be
encouraged, the growing crisis in the cities suggests that new alternatives
must be explored. One of the most promising alternatives may be public
schools. With innovation, public schools could be structured to meet the
associational needs of the inner-city youth and perform the mainstream-
ing function traditionally performed by private intimate associations.
Because discussion concerning public schools among contemporary
Americans generally focuses on standardized test scores or other meas-
ures of the amount of factual information conveyed from teacher to pu-
pil, an effort to evaluate such an institution in terms of its ability to
function as an intimate association will undoubtedly strike many as
strange. Such an evaluation may not seem so foreign, however, when
viewed in light of the history of public education in America."
Schools have long been linked in American thought to one of the
75. Wirth, supra note 74, at 47.
76. One former gang member articulated the appeal of gangs for many inner-city African-
American males in the following manner: "A gang is a family, no doubt about it .... The
thing is not to stop the gangs; it is to stop the negativity of the gangs.... The great unity that
black people have is gangs ....." Robert Allen, Gangs Cannot be Abolished, in INNER CrrY
VIOLENCE 58, 59 (Gary E. McCuen ed., 1990) (quoting testimony before the House Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, March 9, 1988).
Another observer explained:
[A] persistent reason for joining gangs is the sense of absolute belonging and unsur-
passed social love that results from gang membership. Especially for young black
men whose lives are at a low premium in America, gangs have fulfilled a primal need
to possess a sense of social cohesion through group identity.
Michael Dyson, The Plight of the Black Men, in ZETA, Feb. 1989, quoted in Allen, supra, at
60.
77. De Tocqueville observed firsthand the early connection between schools and volun-
tary associations. "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form
associations.... The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found establish-
ments for education, to build inns, to construct churches... ; and in this manner they found
hospitals, prisons, and schools." 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 128 (emphasis added).
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best-recognized intimate associations: the family.78 The belief that
schools stand in loco parentis had real meaning for most early Ameri-
cans;7 9 "schools in the early days of the Republic were almost literally
extensions of the home."8 ° Schools were to aid parents in cultivating and
transmitting to the new generation of students the values of the family.
Because the exact content of those values would vary in a pluralistic soci-
ety such as America, the need for, and desirability of, local control over
education was recognized early and repeatedly reaffirmed.81 The sup-
portive role of schools in accomplishing the tasks of the fundamental
intimate association of family is thus well established.82
This congruence between the role of schools and intimate associa-
tions is strengthened when one focuses on the function of intimate as-
sociations in cultivating and transmitting shared' ideals and beliefs
essential to the preservation of our Nation.83 The arguments of Thomas
Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, Horace Mann, and others that a public school
system could greatly aid in education for citizenship led to the sweeping
advance of free compulsory public education systems throughout the
states in the nineteenth century.84 Similarly, modem sociologists and ed-
78. As Bruce Hafen has observed, "Both chronologically and conceptually, the education
of American children was originally viewed as a natural extension of family life and parental
interests." Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 671 (1987). Hafen traces the
link between families and schools from Ancient Greece and Rome, through England, into the
colonies. Id.
79. The Supreme Court at times has indicated that both parents and teachers traditionally
have played a role in preparing children to assume their obligations in society. See, e.g., Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (stating that "[t]he legislature could properly
conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility").
80. Hafen, supra note 78, at 667.
81. Id. at 672-73; see, eg., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445 (1992) ("Returning
schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore
their true accountability in our governmental system."); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct.
630, 637 (1991) ("Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in
decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs."); Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (recognizing that "local autonomy of
school districts is a vital national tradition").
82. Some have asserted that the connection between the role of the family and that of the
school is especially strong among African-American students. See JACQUELINE J. IRVINE,
BLACK STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRAcrICES AND PRESCRIPTIONS 47
(1990) (asserting that for African-American students the relationship between teacher and stu-
dent is closely related to the parent-child relationship).
83. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
84. Hafen, supra note 78, at 674-75. Modern scholars continue to emphasize this role of
schools as educators of civic virtue:
[T]he public school tradition, reflected in everything from the copybook headings to
1993] INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS 613
ucators have confirmed that "American public schools socialize youth to
common norms and values."1
85
More importantly, the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly empha-
sized schools' role in preparing students to live meaningfully in a demo-
cratic society. "We have ... acknowledged," the Court stated in 1982,
"that public schools are vitally important 'in the preparation of individu-
als for participation as citizens.' "86 Similar pronouncements appear in
other Court decisions.87
This "process of educating our youth for citizenship" is not limited
to the formal teaching process.8 8 It extends to the ways in which the
school is organized and the methods by which concepts are taught. 9
Thus, public school officials have an interest, and considerable leeway, in
deciding what kinds of individuals teach in public schools,9" the content
the pledge of allegiance ... includes a commitment to both personal character and
public virtue. The idea that education was essential to the theory of democracy de-
pended in no small part on the assumption that education would aid the development
of these general abilities and attitudes as universally shared matters of value.
Id. at 668 n.21.
85. Adam Gamoran, Civil Religion in American Schools, 51 Soc. ANALYSIS 235, 247
(1990). Others have asserted the socializing impact of schools from a normative viewpoint.
See Molefi K. Asante, The Afrocentric Idea in Education, 60 J. NEGRO Enuc. 170, 170 (1991)
("Education is fundamentally a social phenomenon whose ultimate purpose is to socialize the
learner; to send a child to school is to prepare the child to become part of a social group.").
86. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76 (1979)).
87. For example, one of the reasons unequal educational facilities for African-Americans
were constitutionally unacceptable was that education "is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values ... and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that public
schools have been a traditional source of strength for America); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (recognizing that the grave significance of education to the
individual and to our society cannot be doubted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972) ("[P]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a state."); Abing-
ton Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (regarding
public schools as "a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government"); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (recognizing that teachers
shape the attitudes of young minds toward the society in which they live).
88. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). As the Court ex-
plained, "The process of educating our youth for citizenship" is "not confined to books, the
curriculum, and the civics class." Id.
89. One sociologist has outlined the pervasive ways in which "American Civil Religion" is
taught in public elementary schools, including through rituals such as the pledge of allegiance,
discussion of national holidays, art projects, assemblies, and social studies. Gamoran, supra
note 85, at 238-47.
90. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-81 (1979) (maintaining that a state can constitu-
tionally exclude aliens from school teaching positions).
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of the curriculum,91 and the manner in which students and teachers con-
duct themselves while in school.92 In short, the Court explicitly and re-
peatedly has recognized that public schools serve to "inculcat[e]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic polit-
ical system" and act "as an 'assimilative force' by which diverse and con-
fficting elements in our society are brought together on a broad but
common ground." 93
Given the Court's recognition that public schools can and ought to
teach the values of civic virtue, and its acknowledgement that constitu-
tional protection should be extended to intimate associations because
they perform this role, it is only a small step to conclude that public
schools are entitled to some constitutional deference when performing
this function. Clearly, public schools meet the generalized functional test
outlined above in that they have traditionally performed the function of
transmitting and cultivating values, such as civic virtue, to new genera-
tions of students. Moreover, application of the four-prong Roberts test
demonstrates that the leap is more of a small step than might at first
appear.
First, the size of the key component of the public school-the indi-
vidual class 94-fits comfortably within the judicial guidance provided for
this factor. The average public school classroom contains 17.4 stu-
dents.9  This is small enough to be considered intimate, especially in
light of the Supreme Court's recognition that groups of more than 400
91. See, eg., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 542-44 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that
a school board may remove books from a reading list); President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Com-
munity Sch. Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 291-93 (2d Cir.) (upholding school board decision to
remove a library book), cert denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). But see Minarcini v. Strongsville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580-83 (6th Cir. 1976) (invalidating on constitutional grounds
school board decision to remove certain volumes from school library).
92. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (stating that school may prohibit lewd, indecent, or offensive
student speech).
93. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77; see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (observing that "public edu-
cation must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the
practice of self-government in the community and the nation") (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD
& MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
The link between the Court's conclusion that schools prepare pupils for citizenship and
the sociological studies that it cited in Ambach has been questioned. Tyll van Geel, The Search
for Constitutional Limits on GovernmentalAuthority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REv. 197,
264-71 (1983). Van Geel at most raises questions about whether public schools have been
successful at performing the assimilative and educational functions attributed to them by the
Court. He does not provide evidence that schools cannot perform this role.
94. It is more appropriate to consider the class, rather than the entire school, because
most teaching occurs at the class rather than the school level.
95. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE EDUCATION PERFORMANCE CHART, 1982 AND 1989.
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might qualify as intimate associations.96
The second factor of the Roberts test-the purpose of the associa-
tion-clearly is met by the public schools' mandate to educate common
citizens and prepare them to be productive members of a democratic so-
ciety. This type of education is one of the primary purposes for which
constitutional protection is given to intimate associations.
The third Roberts requirement, seclusion, would seem at first glance
not to be met here. By definition, public schools are not private or se-
cluded institutions. Nonetheless, school officials traditionally have as-
serted authority to exclude non-students from the classroom during
school hours. This is done primarily to create the kind of atmosphere in
which learning (including the inculcation of values such as civic virtue)
can take place effectively. Thus, unlike business clubs, public schools do
not routinely invite the participation of strangers in the teaching process,
nor do strangers play a crucial role in schools' ordinary existence.97
When outsiders are allowed to attend, it is usually in the capacity of
silent observers or participants under the strict control of the teacher.
Certainly, individual class members cannot invite strangers off the street
to come in and participate.
The forth Roberts criterion, selectivity, also appears problematic at
first glance. Public schools traditionally have been open to any persons
of the requisite ages who reside within a certain geographic area. An
organization whose exclusionary criteria are limited to residency and age
is not tremendously selective. Indeed, the political and social attractive-
ness of public education results from it being open to all.98 Yet in some
96. In discussing the possible success of as-applied challenges to a New York City anti-
discrimination ordinance, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy expressly observed that "in such a
large city a club with over 400 members may still be relatively intimate in nature, so that a
constitutional right to control membership takes precedence." New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 19 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority implicitly
recognized the same possibility when it stated that "there may be clubs that would be entitled
to constitutional protection" despite the fact that the law applied only to clubs with at least
400 members. Id. at 12.
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, the Court refused to grant
intimate association protection to clubs with fewer than 20 members, but the key size factor
appeared to be that there was "no upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary Club."
481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987). Thus, some clubs had more than 900 members, ia, a number much
larger than any public school class. See U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., supra note 95 (largest average
class size in U.S. in 1989 was 24.5 in Utah).
97. In rejecting the claims of the Rotary Clubs, the Jaycees, and the New York State Club
Association, the Supreme Court emphasized "the kind of role that strangers play in their ordi-
nary existence [and] the regular participation of strangers at meetings." New York State Club
Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 12 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 621 (1984)).
98. Many state constitutions include the goal that public education be provided to all.
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respects public education is highly selective. Public schools commonly
exercise the authority to select which students will participate in which
classes based on their intellectual, athletic, and artistic abilities.99 Such
selectivity is justified because it facilitates effective educating in certain
areas. Information and skills can be taught more effectively to persons of
similar aptitude in that area."°° Courts should allow a similar degree of
selectivity by a school seeking to perform its function of inculcating
youth for citizenship. Thus, public schools could meet the selectivity cri-
terion for intimate associations.
On a functional level the gap between public schools and judicially-
recognized intimate associations is not great. This is not to suggest that
the distinction between public schools and traditionally-recognized pri-
vate intimate associations be eliminated 01 or that local public schools
See, eg., ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educa-
tional development of all persons to the limits of their capacities."); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4,
para. 1 ("The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State .... );
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.");
UTAH CONST. art. X, § I ("The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and mainte-
nance of the state's education systems including ... a public education system, which shall be
open to all children of the state. .. ").
99. For example, public schools in the state of Iowa have gifted and talented classes for
persons with extraordinary (1) general intellectual ability, (2) specific academic aptitude, (3)
creative or productive thinking, (4) leadership ability, (5) visual and performing arts skills, and
(6) psychomotor ability. Joan Breiter, Gifted Education in a Midwest State: Focus on Inser-
vice 2-3 (Nov. 9, 1988) (paper presented at the Convention of the National Association for
Gifted Children, Orlando, Fla.).
100. Francis Lawrenz, Aptitude Treatment Effects of Laboratory Grouping Method for Stu-
dents ofDiffering Reasoning Ability, 22 J. REs. Sci. TEACHING 279, 286 (1985); John Newfield
& Virginia B. McElyea, Achievement and Attitudinal Differences Among Students in Regular,
Remedial and Advanced Classes, 52 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDuc. 47, 47 (1983). But see Len
Unsworth, Meeting Individual Needs Through Flexible Within-Class Grouping of Pupils, 38
READING TCHR. 298, 298 (1984).
101. Professor Deborah Rhode has argued that the unfavorable treatment extended gov-
ernmental associations ought to be expanded to include some private associations (the reverse
of the position asserted in this Article). Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81
Nw. U. L. REv. 106, 125-27 (1986). Professor Rhode agrees that court decisions have
"blurred" the line between private and public entities, id. at 109, and, like this Article, argues
for a more functional analysis of the role and protected sphere of associations. Id. at 124-28
("We need not only a better set of rules but also a better understanding of the capacity of those
rules to express our underlying social aspirations.").
The strikingly different outcome that Professor Rhode advocates is, in part, a result of her
focusing almost exclusively on the individualistic benefits of intimate associations rather than
the societal benefits. See, e.g., id. at 118 ("Such associations preserve opportunities for self-
expression and mutual commitment, as well as constraints on governmental power."); id. at
124-25 (stating that the values of single-sex associations are "choice and intimacy" and "male
cohesiveness"). Although Professor Rhode asserts that associations promote both private and
public values, id. at 125, it is clear that the public values she refers to are the public values of
1993] INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS
are constitutionally entitled to the same protection from outside interfer-
ence as are families. 102 That public schools are public and governmental
is significant, 10 3 and courts should never overlook that ftudamental fact.
That schools are vehicles for educating and shaping the youth of
America is an equally significant fact that should not be ignored, how-
ever. When a local school board affects individual rights by decisions
made in furtherance of the school's role as an educational institution,
courts need not, and have not, felt compelled to treat schools as they
would federal or state governments. Thus, the Supreme Court has ob-
served that the First Amendment rights of public school students are
"not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other set-
tings" and that they must be "applied in light of the special character-
istics of the school environment."105 The Court has drawn similar
distinctions when applying the Fourth Amendment in public school
settings. 106
The Court has, therefore, recognized that not all governmental units
need be treated identically under the Constitution. Recognizing the
unique role performed by local public schools, the Court has used a more
functional approach in applying constitutional limitations when public
schools are the governmental actors than when state or federal legislation
is involved. In keeping with this functional approach, while public
expressive associations, such as collective expression, rather than the societal value of intimate
associations that can transmit essential shared beliefs and mainstream individuals into society.
See, eg., id. at 118 (explaining that associations present opportunities for "self-expression and
collective exploration"); id. at 120 ("[S]exual integration need not impair an organization's
expressive activities.") (emphasis added).
102. The Roberts Court recognized that different intimate associations might well merit
different constitutional protection depending on their ability to carry out a constitutionally-
protected role:
Between these poles [of family relationships and a large business enterprise] lies a
broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to consti-
tutional protection from particular incursions by the State. Determining the limits of
state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association
therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objec-
tive characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenu-
ated of personal attachments.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
103. See infra notes 215-33 and accompanying text.
104. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
105. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
106. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (balancing privacy interest of
students against "school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learn-
ing can take place" and concluding that "the school setting requires some easing of the restric-
tions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject").
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schools may not be entitled to the same constitutional protection as inti-
mate associations, their ability to perform an associational role should
entitle them to some constitutional deference when their actions are chal-
lenged on other constitutional grounds.10 7  For example, even though
constitutional challenges may arise, courts should give schools as much
leeway to assign students to classes in a manner that carries out their
associational role of teaching civic virtue as is given to similar decisions
schools make in order to teach physics, calculus, or remedial reading
effectively.
Recognition of the associational role of public schools would alter
the reasoning, and perhaps the outcome, of a recent federal district court
decision prohibiting all-male public elementary school academies.108
107. This Article does not assert that local public schools are entitled to the same constitu-
tional protection from state and federal legislative interference as that currently provided to
private intimate associations. Indeed, it does not assert that such entities are entitled to any
constitutional protection from legislative actions of the federal or state government. Instead, it
advocates that courts should adopt a slightly different approach when evaluating constitutional
challenges to decisions made by local schools in performing their associational roles. See infra
notes 108-26 and accompanying text. Thus, the emphasis is on judicial deference to the local
decisionmaker, rather than constitutional protection from legislative interference.
In contrast, this Article does maintain that Native American tribes are entitled to consti-
tutional protection from some forms of state and federal legislative intrusions in tribal matters.
See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text. This protection for tribes is justified by both
theoretical and practical differences between tribes and local government entities like school
districts. The primary theoretical difference between the two entities is that tribes existed long
before the state and federal governments were formed. See Carol L. Bagley & JoAnn
Ruckmann, Iroquois Contributions to Modern Democracy and Communism, 7 AM. INDIAN
CULTURE RES. J. 53, 53 (1983) (noting "persuasive evidence that North American democracy
began between 330 to 500 years [before the American Revolution] with the Iroquois Law of
the Great Peace"). As a result, tribes, unlike local governments, have inherent authority to
govern; they need not rely on outside legislative power to give them authority to act. Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d
89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956). Therefore, granting tribes greater freedom from outside legislative
inference than that granted local schools (which, in legal theory, are mere creations of state
legislation) is conceptually justifiable.
Equally important is the practical reality that, in many instances, tribes have long been
the primary entity performing the associational role for Native Americans. RUSSEL L. BARSH
& JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY vii ("Trib-
alism has always been the Road, that is, the heart and spirit of the Indian people."). In con-
trast, public schools usually have been viewed, at best, as a supplement to primary associations
like families. This reality is reflected in the deep attachment many Native Americans form
with their tribes. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. Thus, constitutional protec-
tion for tribes is not only more justifiable, it is also more essential to the proper functioning of
the primary association in that society.
108. See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Mich. 1991). After the
district court issued a preliminary injunction, the school district backed away from its plan,
concluding that the chances of winning the case were so slim that the additional expenditure of
funds was not justified. Ron Russell, All-Male Schools Plans Dropped by Detroit Board, DE-
TRorr NEWS, Nov. 7, 1991.
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That decision, Garrett v. Board of Education, focused on tile Detroit City
School District's plan to open three voluntary all-male academies for
boys in preschool through fifth grade. The school district proposed the
academies in response to the high dropout, unemployment, and homicide
rates of African-American males. 109 The academies' curricula was to be
altered to include emphasis on male responsibility, a class entitled "Rites
of Passage," and futuristic lessons in preparation for twenty-first century
careers. 1 ° In short, the academies were intended to provide remedial
associational help to those who needed it most.
The district court acknowledged that inner city males in Detroit
were an "endangered species" and conceded that "the purpose for which
the Academies came into being [was] an important one."'' Nonetheless,
the court concluded that this purpose was "insufficient to override the
rights of females to equal opportunities" and enjoined the school district
from proceeding. 12 Although the school district's failure adequately to
establish the link between the absence of females in the classroom and
the achievement of its goals"' was a critical factor in the court's deci-
109. The academies were not limited to "at-risk" males (those who through use of a seven-
variable formula were most likely to have one or more of the identified problems). One-third
of the student body was to be made up of "high-need" students, one-third of "mid-level"
students, and one-third of "low need" students. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1006 n.3.
110. Id The school district planned to use an Afrocentric curriculum and to provide men-
tors, Saturday classes, individualized counseling, extended classroom hours, and student
uniforms. Id; see Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285,
1294-95 (1992) (describing Afrocentric curriculum).
111. 775 F. Supp. at 1014.
112. Id.
113. Whether such a showing could have been made is not entirely clear. Some experts
have concluded, however, that segregation by sex can and does make a difference in a school's
ability to teach certain subjects. Increasing evidence that males and females process some
information differently and that female students react differently than male students to the
traditional classroom setting has led some to advocate sex-segregated math and science classes.
Richard N. Ostling, Is School Unfair to Girls?, TIME, Feb. 24, 1992, at 62. See generally
United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 898 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding district court finding
that there is a "pedagogical justification for a single-sex education"). Similar reasoning might
well justify sex-segregated classes for associational purposes. One informal study in New Orle-
ans found that by fifth grade, nearly all African-American males felt alienated from school (as
do many female students in traditional math and science classes). Having an all-male school
would "force them to participate in school at every level. You force them to be in the student
government. You force them to take part in the photography club. You force them to be in
the band and not just wind up on the football team and the baseball team." MacNeil/Lehrer
NewsHour: Separate Equals Better? (PBS television broadcast, May 1, 1991) (comments of
Dwight McKenna) (transcript on file with author).
All-male academies also would allow the school to make adjustments in response to spe-
cific inner-city male youth needs, adjustments that are not always feasible or fair in a co-ed
setting. Because male children are typically more aggressive than females, co-educational
schools find it difficult to meet the needs of both groups. Id. (comments of Alvin Poussaint).
An all-male school, however, could implement "more recess periods, more activity focus types
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sion, the overall tenor of the decision suggests that establishing such a
link might not have been enough. 114 More importantly, by adhering to
the traditional uniformistic view of governments, the court was overly
formalistic and completely failed to consider the associational role of the
academies and the societal interest in having that role performed. Appli-
cation of the associational right outlined above could, therefore, alter the
outcome of such a case. It would certainly alter the reasoning.
The district court focused on the ability of all-male academies to
solve specific problems (high dropout, unemployment, and homicide
rates among African-American males). It then balanced the state's inter-
est in achieving these non-constitutional public policies against the fe-
male student's constitutional right of equal protection,115 using the
intermediate scrutiny typically applied to gender-based equal protection
challenges to state policies. 6 This approach is clearly the correct one
when one challenges state statutory policies such as different legal drink-
ing ages for men and women. 1 7 It may not be appropriate, however,
when the governmental decision is a local school board decision to create
an association that serves not merely a legitimate police power interest of
of periods." Id. Moreover, all-male schools could respond more directly to the need of young
black males, particularly those from single parent households, to form positive peer groups.
Id. See generally Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection
Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REv. 2003, 2036-48 (1992) (asserting
that the classification in education between African-American males and females is permissible
because it is based on real differences between the two groups that warrant different treatment
in the education context).
114. Although the court indicated in one portion of the opinion that the school district had
failed to establish the necessary substantial relationship between the exclusion of girls and the
achievement of the school's purpose, 775 F. Supp. at 1008, it later expressed doubt about the
sufficiency of the purpose: "This court views the purpose for which the Academies came into
being as an important one. It acknowledges the status of urban males as an 'endangered spe-
cies.' The purpose, however, is insufficient to override the rights offemales to equal opportuni-
ties." Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
115. The Garrett court did not limit its decision to the constitutional issue. It also found
that the academies would likely violate various federal and state statutory provisions. Id. at
1008-12. This Article, however, focuses only on the constitutional claim.
116. There is some indication that the district court used something closer to the strict
scrutiny standard. While the court at one point stated that the school district would have to
show that gender-based discrimination was "substantially related" to the achievement of its
goals, it later noted the school district's failure to show how exclusion of females "is necessary"
to combat the identified problems. Id. at 1008 (emphasis added). The requirement that the
discrimination be "necessary" to the achievement of the state's purpose is one usually reserved
for strict scrutiny. See, eg., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)
(stating that discrimination in voting rights is valid only if "necessary to promote a compelling
state interest") (emphasis added); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (finding
durational residency requirement valid only if it is "shown to be necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest") (emphasis added and in original).
117. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976).
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the state but also provides a constitutionally protected social benefit.
When the decision involves the balancing of two opposing constitutional
interests, the balance will surely tip more often in favor of the govern-
mental interest than when the balance involves a constitutional right
against a non-constitutional right.
1 18
Thus, if the associational role of public schools were recognized, a
court might adopt an approach similar to that used by the Supreme
Court in resolving the conflict between students' First Amendment right
of free expression and a school's interest in serving as an educational
institution. When such rights conflict, the Court uses a two-step ap-
proach.119 It first determines whether the student's expression arises in
an educational context, 120 thereby implicating the school's educational
mission.121 If the answer to that inquiry is affirmative, the Court then
applies a rational basis test to determine whether the limitation will be
upheld. 22 If, on the other hand, the expression does not involve the
school's educational mission, such as when the student's expression
merely happens to occur on the school premises, a higher standard of
scrutiny is used.' 23 School officials are given more leeway in the former
118. While a government does not technically have any constitutional rights under the Bill
of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment, its interest in advancing the constitutional rights of
its citizens is something more than a legitimate governmental interest. Thus, if a government
infringes on the constitutional rights of some of its citizens when it is seeking to enhance a
different constitutional right of another set of its citizens, it is granted more leeway than when
it infringes on the same right while attempting to advance merely a legitimate governmental
interest. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (finding
government's compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education-in advanc-
ing its citizens equal protection rights-to outweigh school's free exercise right) with Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972) (finding government's legitimate interest in ensuring
education of children through compulsory attendance law insufficient to justify infringement
on parent's free exercise and associational rights).
119. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268-73 (1988). Bruce Hafen has
more carefully evaluated and explained this two-step inquiry in his writings. See Bruce C.
Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DuKE
L.J. 685, 693-94.
120. For example, in Hazelwood, the Court found it significant that the student newspaper
"was to be part of the educational curriculum and a 'regular classroom activitty].'" 484 U.S.
at 268. The Court also emphasized that the school sponsored the newspaper as "a supervised
learning experience for journalism students" and not as a forum for the free exchange of ideas.
Id. at 270. Similarly, in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the Court
noted that the assembly at which the speech occurred "was part of a school-sponsored educa-
tional program in self-government." Id. at 677.
121. Hafen, supra note 119, at 693.
122. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 ("[S]chool officials [are] entitled to regulate the contents
of [the newspaper] in any reasonable manner."); id. at 273 ("[E]ducators do not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legit-
imate pedagogical concerns.").
123. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (hold-
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situation, in part "to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach." '124 Without such leeway, the Court has
concluded, "the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their
role as 'a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values
... and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.' ",125
Recognition of the associational role of public schools could justify
the use of a similar two-step process by a court evaluating an equal pro-
tection challenge to a school's actions. Initially, the court would have to
determine whether the challenged discrimination was implemented to
advance the associational role of the school: to transmit the shared ideals
and beliefs of the Nation or cultivate civic virtue. If the answer to this
inquiry were affrmative, the court would reject the challenge as long as
the school could establish a rational connection-rather than a substan-
tial relationship-to the accomplishment of that end. If the challenged
discrimination were implemented to achieve some other, non-constitu-
tional purpose, the court would apply a higher level of scrutiny.
While a lower court might be hesitant to alter the equal protection
analysis in this manner, recognition of the constitutional nature of the
school's interest, when it exists, should cause greater judicial deference to
the local board's decision. Moreover, the "substantial relationship" test
normally applied in cases of gender discrimination is vague enough to
accommodate some leeway in cases involving genuine clashes between
equal protection and associational rights. 126
Again, this is not to suggest that local school boards may discrimi-
nate arbitrarily without justification or judicial accountability. It merely
means that courts should be more sensitive in recognizing the social ben-
efits of intimate associations and the possibility that intimate govern-
ments can perform this role in appropriate circumstances.
Some may object that the example of the all-male academies runs
head on into the Court's pronouncement in Roberts and Board of Direc-
tors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club that the State has a "compel-
ing that public school limitation on student speech is unconstitutional unless the speech "mate-
rially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others").
The Court in Hazelwood expressly rejected the argument that the higher standard of scrutiny
outlined in Tinker controlled all school situations in which speech might occur. Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 270, 272-73.
124. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
125. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
126. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing
substantial relationship test as "so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial prefer-
ences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as judgments
whether such legislation is directed at 'important' objectives or, whether the relationship to
those objectives is 'substantial' enough").
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ling interest" of "the highest order" in eliminating gender-based
discrimination.'27 Even if some constitutional deference were granted to
public school association, these cases at first glance seem to compel the
conclusion that whatever public schools can do in their associational
role, they cannot discriminate on the basis of gender.
Careful analysis of Roberts and Rotary, however, reveals that the
Court's language should not be interpreted so broadly.'28 The specific
governmental interest recognized as compelling in those two cases was
the State's interest in assuring women "equal access.., to the acquisition
of leadership skills and business contacts."' 129 That specific interest is not
directly impaired by a scheme that permits some male students to have
access to all-male schools. Female students still have access to public
schools-the schools they currently attend. They are not being deprived
of equal access to schools or to leadership skills or business contacts.' 30
Moreover, the Roberts and Rotary holdings, that the states' compel-
ling interest in eliminating the barriers to equal access outweighed the
127. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
128. Justice O'Connor has noted that judicial balancing of two important interests such as
the right of an association to control its membership and the state's goal of ensuring nondis-
criminatory access to commercial opportunities requires "sensitive tools." New York State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Overgener-
alized application of broad interests would seem to be rather like using the proverbial cannon
to shoot a fly.
129. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626).
130. If anything, the female students' opportunity to develop leadership skills may be en-
hanced by the scheme. Because there will be fewer male students in the non-experimental
schools, female students may not have as much trouble assuming the leadership roles tradition-
ally dominated by male students in public schools. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 738 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that studies showed that women
in single-sex colleges "generally ... speak up more in their classes [and] hold more positions of
leadership on campus") (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUC., OPPORTUNrIES
FOR WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973), in KENNETH M. DAVIDSON ET AL., SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION 814 (1975)).
There is evidence that some inner-city female students face problems related to the lack of
positive associations in their lives similar to those of males. See, e.g., Garrett v. Board of
Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (noting Detroit School District's acknowl-
edgment of an "equally urgent and unique crisis facing... female students"); Susan Chira,
Educators Ask if All-Girl Schools Would Make a Difference in Inner Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1991, at B5 (discussing problems of young inner-city females and potential help from all-
female schools). If female students would benefit as much from the associational benefits of
single-sex schools as would male students, the Equal Protection Clause would seem to require
all-female schools if all-male schools are permitted, an issue not faced by the Garrett court.
775 F. Supp. at 1006 n.4; see United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that while state has a legitimate interest in maintaining a single-sex college for
males-the Virginia Military Institute-the Equal Protection Clause required that a similar
opportunity be provided to female students because the state had not shown why the benefits
of single-sex higher education should be provided only to males).
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groups' associational freedom, applied only to the clubs' right of expres-
sive association. 131 The Court gave no indication that the same state in-
terest would be sufficient to overcome a valid claim of intimate
association, and it seems highly unlikely that it would in all cases. If a
woman, for example, stated that she would not consider marrying an-
other woman, the chances that the Court would invalidate a state law
forbidding gender discrimination in such choices (as improbable as such
a law would seem) would appear to be extremely low, if not non-existent.
Some also will assert that the Supreme Court in Runyon v. Mc-
Crary132 already expressly rejected efforts to protect discriminatory ac-
tions by schools under the rubric of associational freedom. Runyon held
that the associational rights of private schools were not violated by appli-
cation of a federal statute prohibiting discrimination; 133 this would seem
to eliminate any possibility that discrimination by public schools would
be upheld. This argument fails to survive careful scrutiny, however.
First, Runyon involved racial, rather than gender, discrimination.
1 3 1
While many continue to advocate the elimination of any distinctions be-
131. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. The clubs' expressive associational
right was not particularly strong in either case. The Roberts Court first concluded that the
Jaycees had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the admission of women would change
the content of the organization's speech, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28, and then went on to note
that "even if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' pro-
tected speech" it was justified by the state's compelling interest. Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Court in Rotary expressed skepticism concerning any adverse impact women
members would have on the clubs' expression and then observed that "[e]ven if the... Act
does work some slight infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association," it
was justified by the state's compelling interest. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).
132. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
133. Id. at 175-79.
134. Whether the associational interest of the school district would be sufficient to justify
racial discrimination is not addressed in this Article. In many situations, it may not be neces-
sary to address that issue because the demographics of many inner-city areas make exclusion
of non-African-Americans from local schools a moot issue: Few, if any, such students live in
inner-city school districts. See Smith, supra note 113, at 2014-15 (arguing that all-male Afri-
can-American schools do not involve racial classifications because "racial separateness in the
inner city is a fact"). Given the heightened scrutiny historically afforded racial classifications
as opposed to gender classifications, see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text, the test
proposed in this Article might have to be adjusted should a school attempt to exclude on the
basis of race, rather than gender. The most appropriate adjustment would be to increase the
level of certainty required with respect to the need to discriminate to perform an associational
role. The school would have to show that the discrimination was implemented to advance the
associational role of the school (as it would in the gender context) in order to justify a depar-
ture from the traditional strict-scrutiny inquiry applied to racial discrimination. See supra
notes 120-26 and accompanying text. Instead of requiring only that the proposed discrimina-
tion reasonably relate to the associational role of the school, however, the inquiry in a racial
context might be whether it was substantially related to that end. This would require the
school to show a greater connection between achieving the associational goal and the racial
classification than would be required under the proposed test for gender discrimination. Id.
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tween the two forms of discrimination, 135 the Supreme Court has not yet
adopted that position. The widespread acceptance of public schools' di-
viding physical education and other activities on the basis of gender136 is
evidence that the distinction between the two forms of discrimination is
not meaningless in the public school context. Surely, similar divisions
based on race would not be tolerated. Indeed, more than twenty years
after it unanimously struck down racial segregation in public schools,
137
an equally divided Court affirmed a lower court decision rejecting an
equal protection challenge by a woman excluded from an all-male public
high school.1 38 While it is far from clear that the Court would reach the
same result if it directly addressed the issue today, it is clear that Ameri-
can society and the Supreme Court are more willing to accept public
school discrimination based on gender than similar differentiations based
on race.
139
Second, the associational claim advanced in Runyon was an expres-
sive associational claim.' 4 As outlined above,14' the right of expressive
association may not be as absolute as the right of intimate association in
some situations. That the former does not protect the school's actions,
therefore, is not conclusive evidence that the latter does not.
Furthermore, the segregation that occurred in Runyon purportedly
was intended to send the message "that racial segregation is desira-
ble." 42 The purpose of the all-male academies is not to send some
message about the desirability of same-sex education, but to provide a
135. See, e.g., Christine Kirwin Krackeler, Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and
the Supreme Court: A Time for Strict Scrutiny, 47 ALB. L. Ruv. 908, 939-44 (1983).
136. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting male student's constitutional challenge to all-female volleyball team), cerL denied,
464 U.S. 818 (1983); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 990-92, 394 N.E.2d
855, 863-64 (1979) (rejecting similar challenge to all-female volleyball team when no male
team is available); B.C. v. Board of Educ., 220 N.J. Super. 214, 221-28, 531 A.2d 1059, 1063-
67 (App. Div. 1987) (rejecting similar challenge to all-female field hockey team).
137. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
138. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (mem.), affig by an equally divided
Court 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976). Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision.
139. See Caren Dubnoff, Does Gender Equality Always Imply Gender Blindness? The Status
of Single-Sex Education for Women, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 295, 306 (1983-84) ("The position
with respect to racial discrimination in education is, in short, clear. The same cannot be said
with respect to single-sex education. Neither Congress nor the Court has taken a consistent
position on this question.").
140. Because Runyon antedated Roberts, the Court did not specifically state that the de-
fendants were relying on a right of expressive, rather than intimate, association. The parents'
claim that application of the statute interfered with their ability to "promote the belief that
racial segregation is desirable," Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976), seems to fit into
the expressive category, however.
141. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
142. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176.
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disadvantaged group with a positive mediating structure currently un-
available to it. The nature of the end sought to be achieved clearly makes
a difference when determining the constitutionality of the means
employed. 143
Finally, the associational claim in Runyon failed as much for lack of
proof as for lack of constitutional coherence. The school was unable to
show that integration would in any way interfere with its ability to con-
vey its desired message. 1" The inability of a claimant to prove that ap-
plication of a statute interferes with the exercise of his constitutional
rights does not preclude another claimant from making a similar claim
upon a different and adequate showing. The connection between the ex-
clusion of females and the ability of the schools to achieve their goal of
providing students with a positive associational experience may not be
incontrovertible, but it is far from insupportable.14 Those wanting to
obtain the protection would have to make the requisite showing, but
Runyon is not an insurmountable barrier to their doing so. Thus, recog-
nition of the associational role of public schools would result in greater
flexibility for school administrators to structure the make-up of the class
in order to carry out an associational function.
Finally, because the associational role of public schools requires
them to transmit shared values and traditions, some may object to judi-
cial deference to their performance of that role on the grounds that pub-
lic schools should not openly engage in the teaching of any values, not
even those of civic virtue.1" While there may be almost uniform na-
tional support for teaching such things as responsibility, respect for
others, and honesty, application of these concepts to specific situations
143. For example, discrimination on the basis of gender would clearly be impermissible if it
is effectuated solely to send the message that women are inferior. Discrimination on the same
basis is permissible to achieve other, more substantial ends, however. See, e.g., Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Act requiring draft
registration for males but not females in part because the "Government's interest in raising
and supporting armies is an 'important governmental interest' ").
144. In language that could be construed as rendering its prior discussion of the balance
between associational rights and the right to be free from discrimination dictum, the Runyon
Court observed: "In any event, as the Court of Appeals noted, 'there is no showing that
discontinuance of [the] discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teach-
ing in these schools of any ideas or dogma."' 427 U.S. at 176 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary,
515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).
145. See supra note 113. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the gender discrimina-
tion contemplated by all-male schools can be justified under the current intermediate-scrutiny
test traditionally applied to gender discrimination. Smith, supra note 113, at 2028-48.
146. Others have suggested that schools teach the kind of civic values found in the Consti-
tution and Declaration of Independence, such as honesty, responsibility, equality, and the rule
of law. Jim Castelli, Morality Without Theology: How to Teach Values in Public Schools, CRI-
sis, Sept. 1990, at 37, 39.
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will result in strikingly different viewpoints.1 47 Some may assert that, in
the absence of consensus, public schools should refrain from engaging in
the debate. National consensus on the exact application of the concepts
of civic virtue to specific situations is not essential to the legitimacy of
teaching the general principles in public schools, however. Local control
over the specific curriculum content exists in large part to allow experi-
mentation and diversity. Local authorities, including individual teach-
ers, are in the best position to determine the exact manner in which
students can best comprehend and internalize the general concepts, as
well as the settings in which they are best taught. If national consensus
exists that the general concepts of responsibility, tolerance, and unselfish-
ness are desirable and essential to the perpetuation of democratic rule,
nothing more is required. If national consensus about such generalities
cannot be achieved, one must wonder whether a true nation exists.
Of course, all-male public schools and education in civic virtues are
not a panacea for the multitude of problems facing today's inner-city Af-
rican-American males; indeed, they may not even be the best answer. It
is entirely possible that the best answer will vary from city to city and
school to school. Fortunately, as noted above, the concept of local con-
trol over school matters is so well enshrined in American legal thought14
that there is some room for experimentation. Unfortunately, the concept
of public schools as associations is so novel to modern American legal
thinking that constitutional rules constraining the actions of the federal
and state government are often blindly applied to public schools without
any consideration of the associational roles of such institutions. The po-
tentially beneficial uses of such school associations are, therefore, gener-
ally ignored by courts and other law-making institutions, and the
contribution of public schools to the resolution of problems facing inner-
city African-Americans remains almost nil.
Every American, especially those on the fringe of society, should
have the opportunity to reap the benefits of membership in a positive
147. Responding to Castelli's article, see icL, the Reverend Charles Fink articulated this
position:
Yes, we will all resonate to words like honesty, truthfulness, responsibility, self-re-
spect, respect for others, etc., but when it comes time to apply these civic virtues to
concrete cases, I think it will be found that [we] disagree sharply on what responsibil-
ity means in terms of sexual conduct, or what respect for others entails as it relates to
abortion and euthanasia, or what self-respect implies when it comes to smoking pot.
Ben Wildavsky, Can You Kot Teach Morality in Public Schools, 2 REsPomsIvE COMMUNITY
46, 49 (1991-92) (quoting Charles Fink).
148. Courts have traditionally reserved decisions concerning the "daily operation of school
systems" to the states and to local school boards. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968).
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intimate association. For a variety of cultural, economic, social, and
other reasons, the traditional intimate associations on which American
society has depended are unavailable to many of today's young African-
American males. Too often, the only intimate association open to them
is the neighborhood gang.149 Although government may not be constitu-
tionally compelled to offer some meaningful, positive alternative, courts
should be more cautious in concluding that public schools are constitu-
tionally precluded from acting in an associational role merely because
they can be labelled as governmental actors. Such overly formalistic rea-
soning deprives young African-American males of the benefits of the
only positive intimate association they may ever encounter. It also pre-
cludes society from reaping the benefits of having those individuals as
productive, caring members of society, leaving instead angry individuals
who are so alienated from society and its values that acts wholly inimical
to that society, such as riots and destruction, seem natural.
IV. FOSTERING DIVERSITY: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS AS BUFFERS
BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE
I believe that the Indian nations of North American are
doomed to perish.... The Indians had only the two alterna-
tives of war or civilization; in other words, they must either
have destroyed the Europeans or become their equals.1 °
Most Native American youth, like most young African-American
males, want to belong to a larger society. For Native American youth,
however, being mainstreamed into American society carries a price not
exacted of individuals from other ethnic groups in America. Native
Americans who wholly integrate into American society not only lessen
their individual ties to a different culture, they also contribute to the de-
struction of that culture. The cultural roots of other ethnic Americans
can be preserved by those back in the homeland without their participa-
149. One former gang member explained the connection between the breakdown of fami-
lies and schools, and the increase in gang membership, in the following manner:
[T]he majority [of gang members] are just misguided kids looking for attention, try-
ing to fill the empty spaces .... As I look around for alternatives, there really aren't
that many for our youth. There used to be a time when kids came from two-parent
homes, had a school that gave them personal attention, and had activities that kept
them out of trouble. A lot of our youth now come from single-parent homes, and
those who do not come from a family of two-working parents. Schools have very
little time for the gang-involved youth, and would rather kick the youth out of school
... than solve the youth's problem.
Marianne Diaz-Parton, Prevention is the Key, in INNER CrrY VIOLENCE, supra note 76, at 53
(excerpted from testimony before the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Fami-
lies, March 9, 1988).
150. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 406.
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tion, but for indigenous Americans "[t]here is no 'old world' homeland
where the culture remains alive."' 151 If Native American culture is to be
kept alive, Native Americans-who daily face assimilationist pressures to
blend into the American melting pot-must keep it alive. Efforts by Na-
tive Americans to become mainstream Americans, therefore, involve an
element not present in the same decision by Americans of other ethnic
backgrounds. The resulting additional strain placed on Native American
youth facing these decisions often manifests itself in the form of the self-
destructive behavior described in the first section of this Article.
15 2
A natural response to this dilemma is to eliminate one of the op-
tions. Native Americans, one might postulate, should either be left com-
pletely alone to define and perpetuate their culture independent of
outside pressure or be forced to assimilate completely into mainstream
American society. This country throughout the past two hundred years
has adopted both extremes without much success. Indeed, one of the
most striking characteristics of formal' 53 federal policy toward Native
Americans since the Revolutionary War has been its inconsistency. Mas-
sive swings between assimilationist and separationist attitudes, goals, and
means have been the norm.154 Unfortunately, the other most striking
characteristic of formal federal Native American policy has been its lack
of success.
The inconsistency in federal policy and its abysmal failure have been
largely the result of the "plenary power" doctrine under which Congress
has complete authority to legislate with respect to Native American
tribes.' 55 While some constitutional protection has been extended to in-
151. Williamson B. Chang, The "Wasteland" in the Western Exploitation of "'Race" and
the Environment, U. COLO. L. Rv. 849, 865 (1992). Although Professor Chang was referring
to Native Hawaiians, his point applies equally to those Native Americans commonly referred
to as American Indians.
152. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
153. "Formal" federal policy refers to the written formal position adopted by the federal
government with respect to Native American tribes. Those actually implementing the policy,
of course, do not always adhere to these formal policies. See, e.g., Philip S. Deloria, The Era of
Indian Self-Determination." An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRsT-HAND AccoUNTS OF
INDIAN-WHrrE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 191, 192 (Kenneth R. Philp ed.,
1985) ("Termination is out of fashion and dead as an announced policy, but termination with a
small 't' is not. For tactical purposes other names might be used, but the long range goal will
not change.").
154. As one scholar has observed: "If there is one eternal verity which emerges from In-
dian law, history, and policy, it is that, like little Alice [in Wonderland], we are never certain of
the 'Rules of Battle.' ... Consistently, the rules have changed, often for reasons that have little
to do with Indian concerns or needs." Rennard Strickland, The Absurd Ballet of 4merican
Indian Policy or American Indian Struggling With Ape on Tropical Landscape: An' Afterword,
31 ME. L. REv. 213, 218 (1979).
155. See, e.g., Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S.
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dividual Native Americans, tribes as tribes have been left to the often
less-than-benevolent whims of Congress.156 The result has been a situa-
tion in which Native American defeats in the policy arena have been
frequent, with tribal victories marked by an asterisk because they are
subject to future legislative override. The uncertainty inherent in such a
state of affairs has prevented the federal government from adopting a
stable, long-term policy toward Native Americans. It also has hindered
tribal planning and development. More importantly, it has left many in-
dividual Native Americans with a profound sense of vulnerability con-
cerning their role in society.
If constitutional protection could be provided to the tribes, the mas-
sive policy swings could be eliminated, and Native Americans could go
about the delicate task of determining their individual and collective fu-
ture with greater confidence and efficacy. The right of intimate associa-
tion, based on a functional analysis, could provide that constitutional
protection. 157
Conceptualizing the tribe as an intimate association is not difficult at
765, 788 n.30 (1984) ("[A]i aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Con-
gress."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("Congress has plenary au-
thority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes
otherwise possess."). See generally Nell Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 199-236 (1984) (describing history of congres-
sional power to regulate Native American affairs).
156. See Kevin J Worthen, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western Legal
Thought on American Indian Sovereignty, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1372, 1384-85 (1991) (book
review).
157. I have suggested elsewhere that tribes might profitably assert the First Amendment
right of expressive association to protect themselves against certain kinds of federal intrusions
into tribal affairs. Id. at 1384-92. At the same time I expressed some pessimism about tribal
use of the related constitutional protection for intimate associations. Id. at 1386. Further
analysis has convinced me that many tribes could qualify for intimate association protection,
especially under a functional analysis that focuses on the role of associations in preserving
cultural diversity. When intimate associational protection is provided to associations that per-
form this role, it overlaps substantially with the right of expressive association, which serves, in
part, to preserve "political and cultural diversity." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622 (1984); see Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544
(1987) ("In many cases, government interference with one form of protected association will
also burden the other form of association."). Some may object that the constitutional protec-
tion afforded private intimate associations should not be extended to tribes because tribes pos-
sess general governmental authority over their members. As the Supreme Court has observed,
tribes "are a good deal more than 'private voluntary organizations.'" United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). At the same time, however, tribes are much more intimate
and have much more of a private face than do the state or federal governments. Tribes, there-
fore, are "unique aggregations," id., entitled to unique protection. Although granting constitu-
tional protection to government associations carries risks, see infra notes 215-16 and
accompanying text, the fact that tribes are more than mere private organizations should not
automatically render them ineligible for constitutional protection. See infra notes 217-33 and
accompanying text.
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a functional level since many tribes have developed and continue to exist
because of common ancestry and deep-seated common beliefs."' 8 The
intimate nature of the relationship between the tribe and its members is
not readily appreciated by many non-Native Americans, however. The
tribe is "not an association of interest but a form of consciousness which
faithfully reflects the experience of Indians." '159 As scholars have ob-
served, membership in a tribe involves "a warm, deep and lasting com-
munal bond among all things in nature in a common vision of their
proper relationship.... Among members of the community it assumes
the form of an interpersonal spiritual communion which has never been
and may never be destroyed by outside forces."'"
Thus, membership in a tribe is much different from citizenship in a
state. When one proclaims oneself a Navajo, Hopi, or Sioux, it means
more than when one identifies oneself as a Virginian or Arizonan. Mem-
bership in a tribe usually implies a distinct point of view on basic matters
that is shared with other members of the tribe. The existence of an alter-
nate world view that accompanies tribal membership is underscored by
tribal members' frequent communication with one another in their native
language. The use of this native language "determines not only the way
[Native Americans] build sentences but also the way [they] view nature
and break up the kaleidoscope of experience into objects and entities
about which to make sentences." 6 ' Thus, the linguistic bond that gener-
ally accompanies tribal membership tends to "foster the continuity of a
highly uniform personality structure" among tribal members. 62 For this
and other reasons, the relationship between tribal members is much more
akin to that found in intimate associations than that between fellow citi-
zens of other governments. Conceptualizing the tribe as an intimate as-
sociation is, accordingly, much easier than for most other governmental
relationships.
More importantly from a functional standpoint, the unique nature
of the relationship among tribal members and the unique setting of tribes
158. Worthen, supra note 44, at 1283-84.
159. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 107, at viii.
160. Id. at vii.
161. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Institutions, Laws and Values of the Hopi Indians: A
Stable State Society, 55 UMKC L. REv. 335, 360 (1987) (quoting LAURA THOMPSON, CUL-
TURE IN CRISIS: A STUDY OF THE Hopi INDIANS 153 (1950)). For example, "The Hopi use
some verbs without subjects which, according to the linguist Benjamin Whorf, facilitates a
holistic view of the universe and a superior comprehension of states of being." Id at 361
(citing THOMPSON, supra, at 155).
162. EDWARD P. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 27 (1970). Dozier
attributes "the persistence of a set of essentially indigenous values and moral concepts" in part
to "the continuity of the native languages." Id.
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in American society provide Native American tribes with the ability to
perform the second of the key societal functions of intimate associations:
"foster[ing] diversity and act[ing] as critical buffers between the individ-
ual and the power of the State."
163
Native American tribes have proved themselves remarkably able to
preserve their distinctive culture despite numerous assimilative forces.
The diversity of the various tribal cultures and the impact of each culture
on its membership is demonstrated by continued adherence to non-Anglo
views on many basic matters. 164 Distinctive legal concepts still used by
many contemporary tribes to resolve internal disputes also evidence the
tribes' ability to foster diverse culture in the face of assimilative forces.
The Navajo Supreme Court has relied increasingly on traditional Navajo
legal principles, rather than Anglo-American common law in reaching
its decisions,1 61 with results occasionally deviating from those that would
have occurred under traditional Anglo-American law. For example, the
Navajo Supreme Court has ruled that because "[p]rivate ownership of
land, as by fee simple in the Anglo legal system is unknown in the Navajo
Nation," ownership always remains in the tribe16 and title cannot be
acquired by adverse possession or prescription.1 67 Tribes, therefore, tra-
163. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
164. For example, while Western industrial societies conceive of time as a "series of identi-
cal units moving inexorably in the same direction" and therefore place a "high value on saving
time, and on speed and efficiency," the Hopi view time as a "rhythmic, cyclical matrix for
cosmic processes" and "distinguish less among past, present, and future than between the
manifest [which includes all that has been, including the past, and is accessible to the present]
and the manifesting [which includes both the mental (and therefore much of the present), as
well as the future]." Ragsdale, supra note 161, at 344-45 (citing JOSEPH BROWN, THE SPIRI-
TUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 118-19 (1982); BENJAMIN WHORF, LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT AND REALITY 59-60 (1956)). The impact of this alternate view of time on the Hopi
way of doing things is indeed profound. As one scholar has observed, because of their alterna-
tive concept of time, "The Hopi have been little concerned with speed and efficiency," id. at
345, in marked contrast to contemporary American society.
165. See, eg., Hood v. Bordy, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6061, 6062-63 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 1991);
Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6009, 6011-12 (Navajo Sup.
Ct. 1990); In re Estate of Wauneka, Sr., 13 Indian L. Rep. 6049, 6050-51 (Navajo Sup. Ct.
1986); Estate of Benally, 5 Navajo Rptr. 174, 179 (1987); In re Estate of Belone, 5 Navajo
Rptr. 161, 165 (1987). Indeed, the Navajo Tribal Code was amended in 1985 to require tribal
courts to apply the law or customs of the Navajo Nation that are not prohibited by federal law.
NAVAJO TRIa. CODE tit. 7, § 204(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984-85). See Tom Tso, The Process of
Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 225, 229-34 (1989) for a general discus-
sion of the law applied in Navajo courts.
166. Hood, 18 Indian L. Rep. at 6063 (citing Benally, 5 Navajo Rptr. at 179).
167. Yazzie v. Jumbo, 5 Navajo Rptr. 75, 77 (1986). A tribal member can, however, ac-
quire a possessory interest in the use and occupancy of land traditionally inhabited by his
ancestors under the concept of "customary use ownership." Hood, 18 Indian L. Rep. at 6063
(citing Wauneka Sr., 13 Indian L. Rep. at 6050 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 1986)). Customary use
ownership also extends to improvements made on the land. Id.
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ditionally have kept alive their diverse cultures despite continued assimi-
lative pressures.
Of course, there must be some limit on the extent to which an inti-
mate association is empowered to foster diversity if its members are to
remain part of the larger society. Tribes can perform the role of mediat-
ing institution meaningfully only if they in turn have some connection to
the larger society. If the tribe has complete, independent governmental
authority over the lives of its members, it becomes the State, rather than
a critical buffer between the individual and the power of the State. In
this respect, the tribes' current status as "domestic dependent nations"16
is conducive to their role as constitutionally protected intimate associa-
tions. 69 At the same time, because of its trust relationship with the
tribes and its direct contribution to many of the conditions creating the
current problems, the federal government should furnish adequate re-
sources and other incentives to provide the tribes enough of a permanent
stake in the present system to foster the necessary connection between
the mediating institution and the national government.
It seems clear, in any event, that under appropriate circumstances
Native American tribal governments can and have performed the diver-
sity-fostering role of intimate associations without severing their connec-
tion to the larger American society. Tribes, therefore, can satisfy the
functional test of intimate association status; furthermore, many tribes
could also meet the more rigid four-factor test of Roberts.
For example, tribes are highly selective in their choice of tribal
members. Membership generally is granted only to those related by
168. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). The tribes' status as domes-
tic dependent nations has been invoked to justify various federal common-law limits on their
authority, including limitations on their ability to alienate tribal land, Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823), enter into direct diplomatic or commercial relations with
foreign nations, Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17, and exercise criminal and, to some
extent, civil jurisdiction over non-Native Americans. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 559 (1981) (holding tribe lacks authority to prohibit non-Native American hunting and
fishing on reservation lands owned by non-Native Americans); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe 435 U.S. 191, 206-12 (1978) (holding that tribal court lacks jurisdiction over criminal
trial of non-Native American).
169. Thus, in order to qualify for constitutional protection as intimate associations, tribes
might have to recognize the superior sovereignty of the federal government in some situations,
such as federal court review of some tribal actions with, of course, appropriate deference to
tribal interests. See Worthen, supra note 44, at 1299 n.130, 1302-04. While many tribal advo-
cates undoubtedly will balk at the suggestion that federal superiority be recognized explicitly,
their concern is more formalistic than realistic, since the superior authority of the federal gov-
ernment is already well recognized legally. Moreover, under the present plenary power
scheme, any more benign view would be subject to the shifting winds of popular opinion,
which do not always blow in the tribes' favor.
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blood to other tribal members."17 The tribal relationship is closely akin
to the family relationship in this respect. One can become part of the
association only by being born into it.
Similarly, the tribal relationship satisfies the Roberts purpose re-
quirement. Unlike many other American governments, a tribe does not
exist solely to provide its citizens with tangible public services like paved
streets or police protection. Tribes exist, in large part, to perpetuate a
way of life. Mainstream American society long has recognized this fact,
which explains why past efforts to eliminate Native American culture
and assimilate Native Americans have been aimed directly at the tribes
themselves. For example, the 1879 General Allotment Act,1 71 the first
formal federal effort to assimilate Native Americans, was intended, in the
words of Theodore Roosevelt, to be "a mighty pulverizing engine to
break up the tribal mass."172 The most recent assimilation effort came in
the form of legislation that completely eliminated or "terminated" nu-
merous tribes.17 3 These efforts impliedly testify to the powerful role of
the tribe in preserving Native American culture and thought. Congress'
decision to omit the "Establishment Clause" from the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1967, which statutorily imposed on tribal governments
many of the same limitations imposed on the federal and state govern-
ments by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 174 similarly
implies a recognition that one of the principal functions of many tribal
governments is to preserve and administer the tribal religion as an essen-
tial part of tribal culture,1 75 a function clearly satisfying the Roberts pur-
170. Although the blood quantum requirement for membership varies from tribe to tribe
(ranging from 1/16 to 1/2), most federally-recognized tribes have some blood quantum re-
quirement. See C. MATTHEW SNIPP, AMERICAN INDIANS: THE FIRST OF THIS LAND 361-65
(App. 4) (1989). A small number of tribes, however, "permit any descendant of a tribal mem-
ber to be enrolled regardless of blood quantum." FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 23 (1982).
171. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The
Act was designed to allot parcels of land to individual tribal members, rather than the tribe,
with surplus lands then being made available to non-Native Americans. See generally
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 19-20 (1987) (describ-
ing policy of the Allotment Act).
172. A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1914, at
6674 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896-1917).
173. During the "Termination Era" of the 1950s, 109 tribes were terminated. Charles F.
Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
139, 151 (1977). Termination of a tribe involved ending the federal trusteeship over the tribe,
distributing tribal assets to individual tribal members, and, in some cases, disbanding the tribe.
Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 1025 (1981).
174. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)).
175. The initial version of the statute would have imposed the Establishment Clause re-
strictions on all tribes. Witnesses at committee hearings pointed out that "the Indian political
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pose criterion.
Many tribes also exclude non-members from important aspects of
the association, particularly those dealing with the preservation and per-
petuation of tribal culture. While the degree to which outsiders are ex-
cluded varies from tribe to tribe176 and has lessened to some extent in
almost all modem tribes, 177 some tribes continue to exclude non-mem-
bers from important tribal ceremonies. For example, as of 1970, one an-
thropologist could assert that no non-Native had ever been permitted to
see the sacred ceremonial rites of the Rio Grande Pueblos178 and that
information about sacred religious customs and practices among all the
Pueblos was "closely guarded." '179 Likewise, access to participation in
and information concerning the sweat lodge ceremonies of the Sioux and
other tribes is also generally quite limited.18° Thus, many tribes continue
system in many tribes is deeply rooted in their religious system" and that imposition of these
restrictions would, therefore, "result in the probable destruction of tribal government in some
cases." Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, Hearings on S. 961, S. 962, S. 964, S.
965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968, and SJ. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965) (statement of Frank J. Barry); see
also id. at 221 (statement of Lawrence Speiser) ("The establishment clause... would create
problems because many of the Indian tribes have a combined theocratic and governmental
structure and many of the things they now do would be barred by the [Flirst [A]mendment.").
Responding to these concerns, the committee changed the bill to omit the provision. Note,
The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1343, 1359 (1969).
176. The Navajo Tribe, for example, generally has not been as secretive in its religious
ceremonies as has its Pueblo neighbors, such as the Hopi, as evidenced by detailed, first-hand
accounts of the most sacred of Navajo rites reported by non-Native scholars. See CLYDE
KLucKHoHN & DOROTHEA LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO 207-23 (1974).
177. Even when ceremonies are opened up to the public, a degree of exclusion often re-
mains. Thus, even though "almost every Hopi ceremony has been reported with painstaking
accuracy by a host of professional observers," the true "meanings and functions of the ceremo-
nies themselves have remained virtually unknown," due in part to "traditional Hopi secrecy."
FRANK WATERS, BOOK OF THE HOPI xiil (1963). Similarly, although ceremonial dances
among the Pueblo Tribes have become lucrative tourist attractions in recent years, the paying
public actually is seeing "ceremonial celebrations," held away from Native American commu-
nities. DOZIER, supra note 162, at 11. While authentic, these public presentations reveal only
secular and recreational dances to outsiders. Id.
178. DOZIER, supra note 162, at 182.
179. Id. at 5; see also Ragsdale, supra note 161, at 369 (stating that tribal initiation rites for
young males "are among the most closely guarded of all Hopi secrets, and [that] the ceremo-
nies cannot be observed by non-Hopi").
180. The traditionally private nature of ceremonies such as the sweat lodge is illustrated by
the criticisms aimed at recent efforts to open up sweat lodge ceremonies to non-Native Ameri-
cans willing to pay a sufficient fee for the privilege. See Paige St. John, Native Americans Say
They Are Being Edged Out of Indian Art, DETRorr NEWS, April 12, 1992, at 18 ("One non-
Indian religious group charged $1,200 for weekend Indian sweat lodge workshops. And an
Arizona healer served caviar, wine and cheese after his $250-a-head sweat ceremony."). Tradi-
tional Native Americans have accused those who have liberalized the admission criteria to
such ceremonies of "'bastardizing our spirituality."' Dirk Johnson, Paper Gives a Voice to
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to exclude outsiders from critical aspects of their relationship with tribal
members.
The Roberts size factor is the most difficult to meet for many tribes.
The membership of some tribes, such as the Navajo and Sioux, measures
in the tens of thousands."'1 Such large groups hardly seem conducive to
intimacy, even under the most liberal meaning of the term. The concept
of intimacy, however, may be viewed differently by Native Americans
from large tribes, who might consider their relationship with other tribal
members to be intimate notwithstanding the size of the tribal popula-
tion.' 2 This is particularly true if the focus shifts to the tribal clan. Just
as individual classes are the functional units of the public school, the clan
is often the fundamental grouping unit of tribes.1 3 Members of these
clans think of each other as relatives,' even though they may not be
Plains Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at A20 (quoting Tim Giago, the Sioux publisher of
the Lakota Times Newspaper). Others have characterized such efforts as being "akin to invit-
ing non-Christians to dabble in sacred Christian rituals-to hold Communion services or 'play
with the Eucharist."' Indian Religions Drawing Increased Interest, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1991, at F18 (quoting Reverend Jon Magnuson).
181. The Bureau of Indian Affairs estimated in 1985 that the population (both on and off
the reservation) of the Navajo Tribe was 166,000, the population of the Pine Ridge Sioux Tribe
was 18,191, and the population of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe was 11,685. DAVID H. GETCHES
& CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (2d ed.
1986) (citing BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, LOCAL ESTIMATES OF RESIDENT INDIAN POPU-
LATION AND LABOR FORCE STATISTICS (1985)). In 1980, more than 60 reservations con-
tained in excess of 1,000 Native American residents. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: 1980 SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT 35 (1980).
182. Worthen, supra note 156, at 1386 n.62.
183. See ARRELL M. GIBSON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT
54 (noting that in "elaborately organized, complex" tribes "families clustered into clans");
Ragsdale, supra note 161, at 363 ("The clan is the fundamental grouping in Pueblo societies,
including that of the Hopi .... "); ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF
AMERICA 24 (1973) (noting that the "social organization of many American Indians was
based on family and clan units" and that "[c]lan relationships and activities were usually im-
portant parts of a group's daily existence").
The importance of the clan has diminished somewhat among some contemporary tribes.
See, e1g., KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 176, at 112-13 (noting that while the clan in
the past was "an important agency of social control... [g]overnment imposition of a law-and-
order organization based on white patterns has tended to destroy this aspect of the native
social system"). Even among these tribes, however, clan membership continues to be a critical
unifying concept. Id. at 123. Moreover, recent efforts have been made to strengthen the signif-
icance of the clan. See REGINA H. LYNCH, A HISTORY OF NAVAJO CLANS vi (1987) (stating
that the goal of book produced by the Navajo Curriculum Center of the Rough Rock School
Board is to "instill the values of Navajo history, culture, kinship and clanship" in Navajo
children).
184. Thus, intermarriage among clan members has traditionally been viewed as incest
among both the Hopi and Navajo. RICHARD B. BRANDT, HOPI ETHICS: A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS 207 (1974); KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 176, at 112. This limitation on
marriage has apparently lessened somewhat in modern times for some Hopi. See SHUICHI
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biologically linked in a strict sense. 85 These clans are numerousI8 6 and
therefore substantially smaller than the tribe itself, 7 but their vitality
depends in large degree on the continued existence of the tribe, much as a
class is functionally dependent on the existence of a school. When the
focus is shifted to the clan, satisfying the Roberts size criterion becomes
much less problematic for many tribes.
In any event, failure to meet the size factor is not necessarily fatal to
an association seeking constitutional protection.' 8 Indeed, the majority
NAGATA, MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS OF MOENKOPI PUEBLO 235-36 (1970) (stating that
while clans still have social significance in marriage decisions, intraclan marriage is not consid-
ered tantamount to incest and no criminal or religious sanctions follow such a union). But see
DOZIER, supra note 162, at 140 (stating that among Hopi and other Western Pueblos, "the
rule that forbids marriage with a member of one's own clan is rarely violated").
185. See DOZIER, supra note 162, at 213 (noting that among Pueblo Indians, including the
Hopi, "[k]nowledge of actual consanguineal (blood) ties are unknown-the basis of affiliation
is a common clan name"); KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 176, at 111 (noting that
Navajos do not limit their relatives along strictly biological lines, but include all members of
their clan).
186. Among the Navajo, "[tihere are, or have been, sixty or more.., clans." KLucK-
HOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 176, at 111. The number of clans in a tribe typically varies
with the population. "Tribes with small populations had perhaps seven, the more populous
ones twelve to twenty or more." GIBSON, supra note 183, at 54; see, eg., Edmund J. Ladd,
Zuni Social and Political Organization, in 9 SMIM ONIAN INSTTION, HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: SouTHwEsT 482, 485 (Alfonso Ortiz ed., 1979) (14 clans
among the Zuni Pueblo).
187. For example, among the Hopi, the populations of two clans in one major village in
1944 numbered only 10 and 23. John C. Connelly, Hopi Social Organization, in SMITHSONIAN
INsTrrrUTION, supra note 186, at 539, 544. Clan members among the Hopi tend to shift alle-
giances to compensate for loss of numbers. Id.
188. The Court has never faced a situation in which an organization satisfied all criteria
except the size criterion. In Roberts, the Court held that the local chapters of the Jaycees did
not qualiy as intimate associations because they failed to meet three of the four critical factors.
Local chapters were "neither small nor selective," and "much of the activity central to the
formation and maintenance of the associations involves the participation of strangers to that
relationship." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984).
The clubs in Rotary Club also failed to meet three of the criteria, although a different
three. Some Rotary Clubs had more than 900 members, with "no upper limit on the member-
ship"; the purpose of the club was to "undertake a variety of service projects,. . . to raise the
standards of the members' businesses and professions, and to improve international relations";
and, "[m]any of the ... Clubs' central activities are carried on in the presence of strangers."
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1987).
The facial challenge in New York State Club Ass'n was rejected because the clubs failed to
meet three criteria: (1) the clubs had more than 400 members; (2) one of their purposes was to
provide "regular meal service" and an atmosphere in which business deals and personal con-
tact valuable for business purposes could be made, and (3) strangers regularly participated in
the meetings and had other roles to play in the ordinary existence of the clubs. New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988).
In its other two post-Roberts decisions, the Court used a much more functionalistic (and
conclusory) approach, focusing on the ability of the organizations to perform the traditional
role of intimate associations, rather than on their ability to fit within the four-factor test. See,
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and concurring opinions in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York indicated that an organization with over 400 members could qualify
for constitutional protection in appropriate situations. 189 Thus, more
populous tribes might satisfy the four-factor analysis despite their larger
size, and some smaller tribes could easily satisfy the size criteria, 190
thereby making the fit with the mechanical Roberts factors complete.
There is strong evidence that increasing the tribes' ability to provide
a close and meaningful culture for their members will alleviate some of
the problems faced by Native American youth. The pressures giving rise
to suicidal behavior are often the result of the absence of any meaningful
mediating structure in the lives of Native American youth.1 91 Too often
there is no organization to which they can relate other than mainstream
American society, which in many ways is foreign to them. When tribal
culture is strong and readily available to perform this mediating role,
suicide is less prevalent. Studies show that "[s]uicide victims more typi-
cally belong to tribes with loose social integration-which emphasize a
high degree of individuality-and that are undergoing rapid socioeco-
nomic change."1 92 Thus, "tribes which emphasize a high degree of indi-
viduality generally exhibit higher rates of suicide than those which
emphasize conformity." ' This correlation suggests some link between
eg., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) ("Any 'personal bonds' that are
formed from the use of a motel room for less than 10 hours are not those that have 'played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation ..... '") (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at
618-19); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) ("It is clear beyond cavil that dance-
hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of 'inti-
mate humanrelationships' referred to in Roberts. .. ").
189. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 12; see also id. at 19 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that an organization is permitted to demonstrate that it qualifies for constitu-
tional protection despite its size).
190. For example, five New Mexico Pueblo Tribes have less total membership than the
Jaycees club at issue in Roberts: Nambe-188 members; Picuris-125 members; Pojoaque-
94 members; Sandia-227 members; and Tesque-236 members. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF CENSUS, AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: SUPPLE-
MENTAL REPORT 11 (1980). The largest Pueblo Tribe, the Hopi, has about 6,600 reservation
members. Most tribal residents, however, reside in one of twelve autonomous villages, whose
average size is less than 1,000. Ragsdale, supra note 161, at 376.
191. Social disintegration and acculturation also have captured a great deal of atten-
tion as possible causes of suicide among Indian and native adolescents. Culture con-
flict and concomitant problems in identity formation are believed to produce a
chronic dysphoria and anomie which render Indian youth vulnerable to suicidal be-
havior during periods of acute stress.
U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INDIAN ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 19
(1990) (citations omitted).
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. Id. "Classic comparisons include the Apache, Navajo, and Pueblo communities, with
the former representing 'looser' social integration and the latter two representing 'tighter' inte-
gration." Id at 19-20.
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tribal cohesion and elimination of the individual despair leading to sui-
cide among Native American youth.
Accordingly, freedom to create the kind of atmosphere in which the
tribe's unique culture can be strengthened and made readily available
could contribute significantly to the resolution of some of the problems
facing Native American youth. While the exact manner in which this
might occur will vary from community to community, one way in which
increased tribal control over critical governmental decisions can posi-
tively contribute to the lives of Native American youth is illustrated by
plans set forth for the Rough Rock School District on the Navajo reser-
vation. Once control of the school was transferred from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to the local Navajo community, the new, all-Navajo
school board based its educational philosophy in part on the assumption
that "a school should be part of a process by which the way of life of a
people is transmitted to the young-the school which is concerned with
importing the culture of an alien society robs the community of its natu-
ral increase." 194 Responding to charges that more emphasis on tradi-
tional tribal values would prepare students only for the world of the past,
one school board member observed: "We are not educating for today;
we are educating for tomorrow. The way a person can live successfully
in tomorrow's world is to have confidence in himself and have an inner
strength which comes only from a positive picture of himself."' Legal
protection for the tribes' associational role would strengthen their ability
to instill this positive self-image in Native American youth through the
perpetuation and inculcation of traditional tribal values. Greater tribal
and less federal control over matters such as education, land use, and the
substantive content of criminal law, would greatly facilitate the tribes'
power to perform their associational role of perpetuating their unique
cultures. 196
The effects of extending intimate associational rights to tribes would
be several. First, providing tribes constitutional protection from federal
interference in matters critically affecting their ability to perpetuate their
unique cultures would preclude.Congress from repeating past, egregious
abuses of its plenary power. Legislative efforts to terminate a tribal en-
tity' 97 would face legal objections similar to those that would be ad-
194. D'ARcy McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN SURVIVALS AND RE-
NEWALS 120 (1973).
195. Id. at 121.
196. See Worthen, supra note 156, at 1389-90 and nn.81-83 (1991) (describing ways in
which lack of tribal control over various governmental activities can adversely impact tribal
culture).
197. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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vanced if Congress legislatively disbanded the NAACP or an even more
intimate association like a family.
Moreover, some current federal policies, which now exist as matters
of legislative largesse, could become constitutionally compelled. For ex-
ample, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,195 which provides a pro-
spective adoptive Native American child's extended family and tribe
with a placement preference in state-court adoption proceedings,
199
could be viewed as implementing legislation recognizing the constitu-
tional limitation on the state government's authority to break up the
traditional Native American intimate association, °0 an association that
extends beyond the traditional Anglo nuclear family.201 If the tribe's re-
lationship with its members is viewed as an intimate association akin to a
family relationship, state efforts to interfere with that relationship would
be subject to scrutiny similar to that applied when a state interferes with,
or terminates, parenta 202 or sibling203 rights. Certainly, if the state-cre-
198. Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988)).
199. The Act provides that when a Native American child covered by the Act is placed for
adoption under state law, "a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members
of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families." 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
200. "In 1980, . . . one of every four Indian children under one year of age was judicially
removed from its family and tribe and placed under non-Indian foster care or in a non-Indian
adoptive home." Stan Watts, Note, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978. Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 213, 213
(1990) (citing Oversight on the Implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hear-
ing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 350
(1984) (statement of Save the Children Foundation)). The Act itself declares the congressional
policy to "promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the... placement
of such children in... adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture."
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
201. For example, among the Pueblo Indians; the notion of family is not limited to the
nuclear unit, but extends to the clan. BRANDT, supra note 184, at 18-19. The Hopi clans "are
composed of one or more extended lineages, each of which includes persons who are related
through matrilineal descent." Ragsdale, supra note 161, at 363.
Evidence of the strong, extended, and intimate ties typical among the Pueblo tribes is
found in their living arrangements. Generations of relatives who trace their common heritage
along a particular maternal line live in rooms and houses adjacent to one another. "Married
men live with their wives, but look upon the households of their mothers and sisters as their
'real' homes. These men return frequently to their natal households to participate in ceremo-
nial life and to exercise their authority over junior members of their own lineages." DOZIER,
supra note 162, at 136-37. Further evidence of the close nature of this "extended" family
relationship is the fact that clan members may not intermarry or have any type of sexual
relations, for it is considered "reprehensible" and akin to incest. BRANDT, supra note 184, at
207.
202. In Trnjillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1985), the
Tenth Circuit held that the relationship between a mother and her son was protected against
intentional state interference by the right of intimate association.
203. In Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the court held
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ated relationship between foster parent and child is entitled to constitu-
tional protection 2 it is but a small conceptual leap to extend similar
protection to the tribal relationship.
Finally, some current federal practices that unduly interfere with
the tribes' ability to carry out their associational function might be ren-
dered unconstitutional. For example, several reservations are populated
by members of distinct tribes forced into one legal entity by the federal
government.205 In some instances, tribes that traditionally were enemies
have been forced together.20 6 Recently, two lawsuits have asserted the
independence of some of the historical tribes from such federally created
legal entities.20 7 Recognition of a constitutionally protected associational
that plaintiffs stated a cause of action when they challenged the state's practice of placing
siblings in separate foster homes and denying them the opportunity to visit their brothers and
sisters. The court concluded that "the children's relationships with their siblings are the sort
of 'intimate human relationships' that are afforded 'a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State."' Id. at 1005 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)); see also Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189 n.5 (recognizing that relation-
ships between siblings "clearly fall within the protected range" established in Roberts).
204. Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 664-65 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
205. The Gila River Indian Community and the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Com-
munity include members of both the Pima and Maricopa Tribes. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS 51, 70 (1974).
The Colorado River Indian Tribes include members of the Mohave and Chemehuevi Tribes, as
well as some Navajo and Hopi. Id. at 43. Other examples of multi-ethnic tribal organizations
include the "Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (in
which the Cherokees, Delawares, Shawnees, and others were included), and the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation." COHEN, supra note 170, at 6.
206. The Wind River Reservation in Wyoming is populated by both the Shoshone and
their historical enemies, the Arapahoe. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 205, at 603.
Each tribe maintains a separate business council, but the business of the reservation as a whole
is carried out by a joint council. Id. at 604.
*207. Western Shoshone Business Council v. Lujan, No. 90C-1020J, (D. Utah 1990); Uintah
Band of Ute Indians v. United States, No. 92-427L (Cl. Ct. 1992). In Western Shoshone,
plaintiffs asked the Bureau of Indian Affairs to approve a contract between the Western Sho-
shone Tribe and a law firm. The Secretary refused because the recognized tribal entity was the
Shoshone-Paiute Tribal Council created under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The
first amended complaint alleged that the Western Shoshone Tribe was indigenous to the area
covered by the reservation and that Paiutes who trespassed there in the late 1800s were eventu-
ally included in a "federated" constitution with the Shoshones at the behest of the Federal
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, paras. 7, 17, 22, 25. The com-
plaint asserted that Congress had recognized the Western Shoshone as a separate tribe prior to
and after the federated constitution, and that the BIA was now illegally refusing to recognize
this separate tribal status. Id paras. 31-32, 36.
In Uintah Ute Indians, the Uintah Band of the Ute Tribe brought suit against the United
States alleging breach of trust in connection with an 1849 treaty with "the Utah" Indians.
Complaint paras. 1-8. The band brought the suit in its own name rather than that of the tribal
entity created by the Indian Reorganization Act-an entity that includes not only the Uintah
Band, but also the Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Utes. The suit, therefore, is an effort by the
band to assert some independence from the legal entity that encompasses other bands.
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right would greatly advance the arguments of these tribes because
"[fjreedom of association... plainly presupposes a freedom not to asso-
ciate."2 °0 If a tribe were characterized as an intimate association, efforts
by the federal government to consolidate tribes by force would be no
more acceptable than other governmental efforts to compel private inti-
mate associations to accept members against their will."M
Recognition of the associational role of tribes would not necessarily
result in a broad policy extending full constitutional protection to all tri-
bal relationships. Because of differences in their make-up, development,
history, and size, some tribes are much better situated to carry out this
associational role than others.210 Moreover, not all acts of a tribe are
essential to its associational role. Consistent with the functional ap-
proach advocated in this Article, tribal challenges to federal interference
should be resolved on a case-by-case basis, with the court making a care-
ful factual inquiry into the ability of the tribe to carry out its alleged
intimate associational role and the exact impact of the federal interfer-
ence on that role.
While this ad hoc approach may seem unwieldy, the Roberts Court
contemplated that it would be necessary. Recognizing the "broad range
of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to consti-
tutional protection from particular incursions by the State," the Court
observed that the resolution of intimate association claims "unavoidably
entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective charac-
teristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most atten-
uated of personal attachments." '211 Thus, a particularized inquiry that
varied from tribe to tribe and case to case would not demand more of
courts and litigants than does the existing law. Again, a small step will
suffice.
208. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). The federal government
has forced a tribe to accept members against its wishes on at least one occasion. Treaty with
the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866, art. 2, 14 Stat. 785, 786 (compelling Creek Tribe to make its
freedmen members of the tribe after the Civil War).
209. In speaking of the right of expressive association, the Roberts Court observed that
"[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire."
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
210. Some mistakenly assume that all Native American tribes are identical. However, as
one Native American anthropologist stated: "tI]t must be realized that Indians do not consti-
tute a monolithic society. The ethnic boundaries which maintain group identity and functions
are essentially tribal in nature." MCNICKLE, supra note 194, at 116. Thus, tribes often differ
from one another in marked ways. For example, because of its larger size and looser system of
social integration, the Navajo Tribe may be less able to act effectively as an intimate associa-
tion than the small Pueblo Tribes of New Mexico.
211. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
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The desirability and legitimacy of extending associational protection
to a tribe will likely vary from tribe to tribe, and situation to situation.
Application of the concept in concrete settings will require further elabo-
ration and consideration of the associational principles only briefly dis-
cussed here. Nonetheless, recognition that tribal entities have been
performing and can continue to perform this role in the lives of their
youth could open the way for new and effective solutions to the problems
currently plaguing Native American youth. Given the consistent failure
of the more traditional federal policies, little can be lost through the use
of this new approach.
V. THE DANGERS OF GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATIOiS: IS THE
REMEDY WORSE THAN THE CURE?
Because the concepts outlined above appear at first glance radically
to reorder existing notions of intimate associations, critical objections un-
doubtedly will arise. Response to two of the more likely objections is
therefore in order.
At the outset, some may assert that government or public associa-
tions by definition cannot be "intimate" because intimacy is synonymous
with privacy.212 This objection, however, is mainly semantic. As Ken-
neth Karst has pointed out, intimacy also refers to "a type of close and
enduring association between people," 2  some of which may be very
public associations. It is this kind of intimacy that is at the core of the
constitutionally protected right of intimate association;21 this kind of re-
lationship can exist between an intimate government and its citizens.
The second objection is far more serious. The scheme advocated in
this Article contemplates that in certain situations the government will
be teaching values to members of the government association. Whenever
government, with its coercive powers, becomes the purveyor of values,
grave dangers arise. Under traditional political theory, the generation of
values by the state "is a hallmark of totalitarianism."21 Thus, De Toc-
queville warned that government could not be the sole generator of the
212. Some of the dictionary definitions of "intimate" are "private, closely personal," and
"characterized by or suggesting privacy." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987) (unabridged).
213. Karst, supra note 53, at 634.
214. Id. This is not to imply that Professor Karst would agree with the general thrust of
this Article, or with any specific part of it. Even within Karst's scheme, however, intimate
associations are not limited to those that take place in private.
215. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 70, at 6. The Supreme Court has expressed this
concern with respect to the actions of public schools. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (expressing concern that public schools not be con-
verted into "enclaves of totalitarianism").
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values at the heart of civic virtue.216 This criticism is powerful and de-
mands some response. Fortunately, several are readily available.
First, in evaluating the totalitarian threat posed by governmental
conveyance of values, one must keep in mind that not all governments
are the same. The concern that governmental conveyance of values will
lead to totalitarianism and tyranny is true only to the extent that the
government is one of the "megastructures., 217  If the government at is-
sue is a large central government, like a national or state government, the
label is clearly apt. If, however, the entity labelled as "government" is in
reality part public and part private and small enough to be controlled
and to be responsive to value input from its members, it becomes a "me-
diating structure": one that has "a private face, giving private life a mea-
sure of stability, and.., a public face, transferring meaning and value to
the megastructures.1211 As noted above, both schools and tribes have to
some extent evolved as extensions of the family.219 They are "hybrids,
imbued with the characteristics of both private and public
organizations."220
Whatever the dangers of government associations, they are lessened
when the sphere of government authority is limited to schools or tribes.
Moreover, the associational benefits from such associations are greater
than from other kinds of government associations, something American
society has long recognized by its support of compulsory public
216. A government can no more be competent to keep alive and to renew the circula-
tion of opinions and feelings amongst a great people, than to manage all the specula-
tions of productive industry. No sooner does a government attempt to go beyond its
political sphere to enter upon this new track, than it exercises, even unintentionally,
an insupportable tyranny.... Governments therefore should not be the only active
powers: associations ought, in democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful
private individuals whom the equality of conditions has swept away.
2 DE ToCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 132.
217. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 70, at 6. Megastructures are the "large institutions
of public life," those institutions which order the public aspects of our lives. Id. at 2. These
include "the large economic conglomerates of capitalist enterprise, big labor, and the growing
bureaucracies that administer wide sectors of the society." Id. According to Berger and Neu-
haus, "the most important large institution in the ordering of modern society is the modem
state itself." Id.
218. Id. at 3. Mediating structures are "those institutions standing between the individual
in his private life and the large institutions of public life [megastructures]." Id. at 2. Examples
include families, churches, and voluntary associations. Id. at 3. Because they are quasi-private
and quasi-public, these institutions help individuals mediate the tension between the public and
the private aspects of their lives. Id. at 2-3.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81, 158; see also Worthen, supra note 44, at
1283-84 (discussing evolution of tribal governments).




Recognition that public schools and tribes are not quintessential
States can, therefore, provide some answer to the charge that granting
these entities constitutional space to perform their associational roles will
lead to totalitarianism. As Lon Fuller once contended: "The bonds that
bind the member to a... school ... may not be as intimate as those that
unite husband and wife, but it does not follow that they are ready to be
bent uncompromisingly" to the full demands of the Constitution.222
Second, membership in the kinds of government associations ad-
dressed in this Article is essentially voluntary.223 If one does not wish to
remain a member of the tribe, one need only ask for removal from the
tribal roll.224 The associational choice is likewise voluntary when attend-
ance at experimental schools is voluntary, as it was for those proposed by
the Detroit School District.
The voluntary nature of membership in these government associa-
tions is significant. Voluntary associations rightfully receive more moral
approbation225 and legal protection226 than involuntary associations.
Moreover, the voluntary nature of membership in these associations en-
sures that they will not supplant those traditional private intimate as-
sociations on which American society has successfully relied for so
long.227 If, for example, the head of the family determines that member-
221. As Bruce Hafen has noted: "Important paradoxes are inherent in the very idea of a
state-operated school system in a democratic society, an idea Professor Franklin Zimring has
described (as it prevailed during the first half of this century) as 'special case socialism at a
time when socialism was a dirty word."' Hafen, supra note 78, at 667 (quoting FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 35 (1982)).
222. Fuller, supra note 71, at 19. Fuller was referring specifically to due process require-
ments in the formation of intimate associations. "[If the law of the state finds itself compelled
to relax requirements of due process when it deals with the formation and dissolution of inti-
mate associations, then we must view with some caution any gross extension of legal forms
throughout our whole associational life." Id.
223. See Worthen, supra note 44, at 1284-86 (discussing "voluntary" nature of membership
in cities and Native American tribes).
224. "A member of any Indian tribe is at liberty to terminate the tribal relationship when-
ever he or she so chooses." COHEN, supra note 170, at 22.
225. See MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CrrI-
ZENSHIP 10 (1970) (asserting that under social contract theory, "groups in which willfulness is
heightened and maximized can rightfully impose greater obligations upon their members than
can those catholic religious and political associations where membership is, for all practical
purposes, inherited").
226. "[C]urrent constitutional law treats 'involuntary' and 'voluntary' groups quite differ-
ently. While classification on the basis of involuntary group affiliations is subject to attack in
the name of equality, voluntary associations are protected in the name of liberty." Sullivan,
supra note 14, at 1714-15.
227. The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized the primary role of parents with re-
spect to the rearing and education of children. See, eg., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
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ship in these intimate government associations is inimical to the values
that he wishes to perpetuate in the family, the family head has full power
to withdraw any member of the family from that association, by either
transferring him to a traditional school or withdrawing him from mem-
bership in the Tribe. Thus, there will be minimal interference with the
autonomy of the primary purveyors of values.228 The sole result will
likely be merely to provide another option for those who feel that rein-
forcement of their teaching will be helpful.
Third, the solution outlined in this Article does not require the elim-
ination of all competing private associations, something which truly
would lead to totalitarianism. 229 Leeway for governments engaged in the
performance of the roles outlined above would merely add new voices to
the existing choir of diverse ideas and value systems. Just as government
sponsorship of mass media through federal funding for public television
does not raise the same concerns that would be created by government
elimination of competing television stations, government sponsorship of
a particular form of association on a voluntary basis does not raise the
same concerns as governmental action prohibiting other kinds of
associations.
Fourth, the limited nature (in terms of both geography and power)
of these associational governmental entities ensures that they will never
have the power to eliminate competing visions of truth generated by
other, more traditional, intimate associations. A school board has lim-
ited power. It cannot control all aspects of a student's life. Non-students
are not directly within its power at all, as long as they do not intrude on
the physical school grounds.230 Although tribal governing powers are
639 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder") (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944)).
228. The Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts that a parent's ability to make
choices for a child can make governmental actions that would otherwise be constitutionally
suspect more acceptable. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (upholding law prohibiting sale of
non-obscene pornography to minors in part because "the prohibition against sales to minors
does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children").
229. De Tocqueville's fear concerning the totalitarian result of governmental inculcation of
values was directed at the situation in which governments were "the only active powers." 2
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 132 (emphasis added).
230. School districts, of course, often are authorized to require non-students to pay prop-
erty taxes. Even the districts' taxing authority is often quite limited, however. First, the dis-
tricts do not have inherent taxing authority and must rely on the state legislature for
permission to tax at all. See, e.g., UTAH CON T. art. XIII, § 5. Second, state statutes or
constitutional provisions often limit the amount the district can tax. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. § 53A-16-104 (1992) (authorizing local school boards to levy a tax for debt service and
capital outlay, but "not to exceed .0024 per dollar of taxable value").
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broader and more pervasive, a tribe's control over the lives of its mem-
bers is also far from complete.231
Finally, this Article does not advocate complete abandonment of the
distinction between government and private associations, nor does imple-
mentation of its suggestions require that all public schools and Native
American tribes be granted the constitutional leeway traditionally af-
forded families and other intimate associations in their decision-making
processes. 32 Courts should treat government entities as intimate as-
sociations only in limited circumstances. The two identified in this Arti-
cle arise when the normal private intimate associations that traditionally
have performed this critical mediating role are simply not available (as in
the case of many inner-city African-American males), or when, for his-
torical or other reasons, the contemporary governmental unit is in reality
an extension or even alter ego of those types of intimate associations (as
in the case of many tribes). There may be other situations in which
"careful assessment.., of [a] relationship's objective characteristics" lo-
cates it on the intimate side of the associational spectrum,233 but courts
should evaluate those cases in light of the very real concerns created by
government control over value systems.
Thus, the admission that a government's authority and ability to act
as an intimate association are limited and subject to abuse does not re-
quire that it be precluded from carrying out that function under all cir-
cumstances. While the fear of totalitarianism is not unfounded,
recognition of the associational role of some governmental units will not
automatically lead to a realization of George Orwell's 1984. Failure to
use the associational capacity of these institutions, however, may lead to
further disaffection among large groups of American youth.
VI. CONCLUSION
The transition from lonely individual to productive member of soci-
ety has not taken place for many inner-city male minorities and for large
portions of our Native American population. A major cause of this dev-
astating failure is that the intimate associations that historically have fa-
cilitated that transition for most Americans are not available in any
meaningful way to these segments of our society. The family, the
231. See Worthen, supra note 44, at 1278-88 (discussing limited authority of tribal and city
governments).
232. As noted above, the reality recognized by both theorists and the Supreme Court is
that associations can be placed on a continuum, which in turn determines the particular limits
of the state's authority to interfere with the associational relationship. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 102-211.
233. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
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church, and other private associations that supplied these bonds have
either been eliminated or allowed to disintegrate. The results of this fail-
ure are becoming increasingly apparent.234 While enormous long-term
progress can be made by rejuvenating these private intimate associa-
tions, 235 dramatic short-term help already is available in existing govern-
mental structures, which, if viewed from the right perspective and
properly limited in authority, can perform this mediating role despite
their "governmental" nature. This suggestion may appear dramatic, but
so is the crisis. At a minimum, we cannot justify our refusal to consider
this potential palliative by blind adherence to formalistic labels. Courts
should be willing to take the small steps necessary to ensure that disad-
vantaged groups can leap forward into productive membership in Ameri-
can society.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
235. Research suggests a close link between success among African-American males and
positive family relationships. Benjamin P. Bowser & Herbert Perkins, Success 4gainst the
Odds: Young Black Men Tell What It Takes, in BLACK MALE ADOLESCENTS, supra note 1, at
185. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that "[b]oth family and school involvement and
encouragement are essential to student motivation to succeed." Id. at 197.
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